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I.  INTRODUCTION1 
Technological developments in the information society 
bring new challenges, both to the applicability and to the enfor-
ceability of the law. One major challenge is posed by new enti-
ties such as pseudonyms, avatars, and software agents that op-
erate at an increasing distance from the physical persons 
“behind” them (the “principal”). In case of accidents or misbe-
havior, current laws require that the physical or legal principal 
behind the entity be found so that she can be held to account. 
This may be problematic if the linkability of the principal and 
the operating entity is questionable. 
In case of a pseudonym, for example an eBay account, the 
physical person who uses the pseudonym is legally responsible; 
however, the law too often becomes useless because it is hard to 
enforce legal rights. Indeed, it can be difficult or impossible to 
discover the link between the physical person and her pseu-
donym. In the case of a software agent, who is the person re-
sponsible—the agent’s programmer, its seller, or its user? What 
happens if the software agent adapts itself and learns from its 
environment so that it eventually behaves in an intrinsically 
unpredictable way? Is it then still meaningful to find a physical 
person or another entity with legal personhood who is account-
able for the behavior of this software agent? 
One solution to this problem has been much discussed in 
the literature: could or should we attribute legal personhood to 
such entities so that they can be legally addressed themselves? 
Attributing personhood to non-human entities is not as strange 
as it might seem at first sight. In most modern legal systems, 
legal personhood is attributed to associations, funds, or even 
ships, even if this is never full personhood in the sense of an 
entitlement to claim the entire range of human rights and li-
berties.2 In principle the law can attribute conditional legal 
                                                          
 1. This article was written as part of the EU-funded project FIDIS (Fu-
ture of Identity in the Information Society), http://www.fidis.net. It builds on 
previous work in which we co-operated with Harald Zwingelberg, 
Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz, Kiel, Germany, whom we 
thank for his help in this research. We also thank Ronald Leenes of Tilburg 
University for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
 2. See, e.g., Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Devel-
oping a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 513, 522 (2007) (noting that corporations and ships have standing 
to sue on the basis of their own injury); Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, 
in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS at 251, 260–61 
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personhood to any well-defined type of entity. Clearly, this does 
not imply that we can simply give legal personhood to avatars 
or software agents. The law has a respectable tradition in flexi-
bly incorporating social and technological developments in its 
system. New conditions created by new paradigms often have 
been interpreted successfully in terms of the existing legal 
framework. At the same time, we also see that when this inter-
pretation becomes too difficult or too costly to maintain, the le-
gal system has proven itself dynamic enough to move along 
with new paradigms: new legal constructions or even new legal 
entities have been created. For example, legal personhood has 
been granted to non-human entities, such as companies, trust 
funds, and states. 
Now, when an action or a transaction is realized with the 
help of an intermediate acting entity, and when this action or 
transaction cannot be linked to the person who is legally re-
sponsible today, what are possible solutions to make the law 
applicable and enforceable? Can current laws comfortably in-
corporate the new entities, or do we need to use the dynamism 
of the legal system to create new legal constructions or even 
new legal persons? 
This issue has been discussed in the literature for almost 
two decades. Since Lawrence Solum’s landmark article Legal 
Personhood for Artificial Intelligences,3 technologies have con-
siderably advanced, new entities like avatars have emerged, 
and the literature has moved along. Recently, an important ad-
dition to the literature has been published in German— a dis-
sertation by Andreas Matthias, which may not yet be familiar 
to the English-language community.4 In light of the ongoing 
                                                          
(Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (“Congress is frequently 
permitted to create juridical persons and to allow them to bring suit in their 
own right. Corporations are the most obvious example. But plaintiffs need not 
be expressly labeled ‘persons,’ juridical or otherwise, and legal rights are also 
given to trusts, municipalities, partnerships, and even ships . . . .”); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the 
Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 2–3 
(2001) (“[T]he truth is that even our existing legal system . . . has long recog-
nized rights in entities other than individual human beings. Churches, part-
nerships, corporations, unions, families, municipalities, even states are rights-
holders indeed, we sometimes classify them as legal persons for a wide range 
of purposes . . . .”). 
 3. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 
N.C.L. REV. 1231 (1992). 
 4. Andreas Matthias, Automaten als Träger von Rechten. Plädoyer für 
eine Gesetzänderung (2007) (dissertation, Humboldt Universität). 
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developments in electronic agents, there is sufficient reason to 
conduct a review of the literature in order to more closely ex-
amine arguments for an against legal personhood for some non-
human acting entities.  This article will also include  a discus-
sion of alternative approaches to solving the “accountability 
gap.” We aim to answer the following research questions: 
1.  Given the rise of new types of acting entities in the in-
formation society that operate at increasing distance from the 
persons who employ them, is current law sufficiently equipped 
to deal with potential conflicts, or would it help to create (li-
mited) legal personhood for some of these new types of acting 
entities in some contexts? 
2.  Under which conditions would non-human entities qual-
ify for the attribution of liability based on culpable and wrong-
ful action and under which conditions could such entities claim 
(post)human rights and liberties? 
Given the generic nature of these questions, we focus on 
law in general rather than on specific legal systems, and we do 
not aim at providing a definitive answer to this question. Ra-
ther, we give various perspectives from common-law and conti-
nental traditions that are relevant for answering these ques-
tions in order to come to a tentative conclusion on which future 
research can build. In Part II, we introduce the challenge of 
various entities operating at increasing distance from their us-
ers and, in Part III,we clarify the concepts of persons, agents, 
and autonomy. Next, in Part IV, we provide an extensive re-
view of literature on the topic of rights for non-humans, from 
the landmark analysis of Solum to recent literature from Ger-
many. After distinguishing between various types of person-
hood and agency that emerge from this review in Part V, we 
answer the research question by outlining a three-stage strate-
gy for the short, middle, and long term in Part VI. 
II.  FACING THE CHALLENGE: EMERGING ENTITIES IN 
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
A.  PSEUDONYMS 
The term “pseudonym” comes from the Greek word pseu-
donumon which means false name.5 Traditionally, a pseu-
                                                          
 5. PSEUDONYM, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN 
LANGUAGE 482 (Warner Books ed. 1987). 
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donym was a fictitious name taken by an author.6 For example, 
Voltaire and Molière are pseudonyms of famous French writers. 
Today, pseudonyms often are used by artists, especially in show 
business, to mask their official identity. In this case, a pseu-
donym can be seen as a self-chosen name that becomes an iden-
tity in the artistic context. In some situations, the pseudonym 
is used to conceal the true identity of the person, acting as a 
privacy-enhancing tool.7 Pseudonyms also function as user IDs 
in the information society. On the Internet, many people use a 
pseudonym (or multiple pseudonyms) to stay anonymous.8 Al-
though pseudonyms have a more instrumental, passive nature 
than the software agents and robots discussed below, they do 
have a certain independent function because they shield the 
persons behind them. In a functional sense, the pseudonyms 
“do business” on behalf of the persons they shield. From this 
perspective, they constitute an entity in their own right, and it 
is this abstract role that makes them a category to consider in 
our discussion of new entities in the information society.9 For 
practical reasons, in this article we will use the term “pseu-
donym” as a proxy for the abstract entity that is represented by 
the pseudonym. 
When a pseudonym is functioning as a mask between a 
human person and the outside world, the pseudonym can ac-
quire a personality of its own and operate at some distance 
from the person it shields. This is particularly the case when 
the pseudonym is a mask shared by more than one person, so 
                                                          
 6. Id. 
 7. FUTURE OF IDENTITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, D 2.13: VIRTUAL 
PERSONS AND IDENTITIES 24 (David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle ed., 2008), avail-
able at http://www.fidis.net/filefilea/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp2-
del2.13_Virtual_PersonP_v1.0.pdf. 
 8. Id. 
 9. This is in line with the approach proposed by a model based on virtual 
persons, developed in David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle et al., Virtual Persons 
and Identities, in THE FUTURE OF IDENTITIY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 75 
(Kai Rannenberg et al., eds., 2009).  In this model, a pseudonym can be seen as 
the identity—and identifier—of a virtual person, which is a special type of ab-
stract entity. According to this model, the pseudonym is the tautological iden-
tity of its corresponding abstract entity: by definition, it identifies this abstract 
entity. In other words, the pseudonym represents an abstract entity that is 
identified by the pseudonym. For example, George Eliot—a pseudonym used 
by Victorian author Mary Anne Evans—identifies the abstract entity called 
George Eliot. This abstract entity does not exist as a person of flesh and bone, 
but is a virtual person known to many as, for example, the author of Middle-
march. 
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that it functions relatively independently from the specific hu-
man beings behind it. A clear example of this is the pseudo-
nyms used on eBay, which allows users to interact with each 
other using user IDs.10 
Mechanisms can be developed to deal efficiently, securely, 
and directly with the pseudonym itself rather than the individ-
ual using this pseudonym. Payment procedures and reputation 
on eBay are good examples. Ebay sellers can offer payment 
through the service PayPal,11 which does not divulge buyers’ 
credit card or other information to the seller. Therefore, the 
buyer need only trust PayPal (not the seller himself anymore) 
not to misuse his credit card information. Reputation is a key 
component when building trust. PayPal, for example, may be 
trusted more than other escrow services in particular because it 
has a strong implicit positive reputation, just by being the pre-
ferred payment method for most eBay buyers and sellers. The 
eBay platform provides a reputation system that allows build-
ing trust between eBay users who do not know each other, who 
have never interacted together and who are hidden behind 
pseudonyms.12 To each eBay user ID is attached a so-called 
“feedback profile”. The feedback profile of an eBay user ID 
measures the concordance between the actual behavior of this 
eBay user ID during his previous transactions and the expected 
behavior of this eBay user ID, according to other users who 
have already taken part into these transactions. The eBay rep-
utation system is fed by users themselves. It collects expe-
riences of previous eBay transaction partners.13 
For acceptance in commercial and legal practice, the ability 
to “de-anonymize” is currently an important attribute of pseu-
donyms. A pseudonym is “de-anonymizable” when the informa-
tion that provides the link to the physical person can be dis-
closed upon request under a defined set of situations, such as 
when a contractual party does not comply with its duties. Such 
disclosures, as well as the control over the requirements of a 
                                                          
 10. See Choosing a User ID, http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/user-
id.html (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 11. About Us, https://www.paypal-media.com/aboutus.cfm (last visited 
May 2, 2010). 
 12. See All About Feedback, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/allaboutfeedback.html (last visited May 2, 
2010). 
 13. Id. 
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disclosure, may be handled by a trusted third party, called a 
linkability broker. Such a broker needs to be in possession of 
the identifying information in order to match the pseudonym 
with the name of the holder. 
In trade and privacy law, trust is a crucial factor influen-
cing the potential use of pseudonyms. Pseudonymous transac-
tions may likely be accepted in cases of an immediate perfor-
mance, but in cases where payment and performance are not 
simultaneous, the seller needs to trust that payment will follow 
and the product or service will be delivered. Some technical and 
organizational solutions like PayPal may be available for en-
hancing trust in these cases. However, before pseudonymous 
transactions can really flourish, more trust-enhancing mechan-
isms will need to be developed and implemented.14 
B.  AVATARS 
Avatars are entities featured in computer games and other 
online environments like Second Life.15 Such digital avatars 
represent the player in the game world of Multi User Dungeons 
(MUDs), Multi User Virtual Environments (MUVEs), Massive-
ly Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) and 
other computer games, collectively referred to as “virtual 
games.”16 The term avatar does not only refer to three-
dimensional representations in virtual games, but also to the 
icons representing a specific user in an online forum or any 
other graphical representation of a computer user.17 For our 
purposes, an avatar is a virtual person representing one or 
more players in the physical world or even a computer pro-
gram. 
Engaging in a virtual game usually starts with the creation 
of a personalized avatar by adjusting the appearance of the 
graphical representation on the screen by choosing skin, facial 
features, and clothes. In many games, particularly role playing 
                                                          
 14. See generally Jacquet-Chiffelle et al., supra note 9; TRUST IN 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: THE ROLE OF TRUST FROM A LEGAL, 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE (J.E.J. Prins et al. eds., 2002). 
 15. See What is Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/?lang=en-US 
(last accessed May 2, 2010). 
 16. See Virtual world – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_world (last accessed May 2, 2010). 
 17. Avatar (computing) – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avatar_%28computing%29 (last accessed May 2, 
2010). 
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games, further attributes such as strength, dexterity and abili-
ties such as swimming, climbing or pickpocketing can be as-
signed to further personalize the avatar.18 In many role playing 
games advancement and development of the avatar is a central 
aspect of the game play. Guiding an avatar in its advancement 
over a long period of time and individualizing the avatar with 
one’s own preferences or getting absorbed by the interaction 
with other avatars forges a tight relationship between the play-
er and his avatar.19 
As having an advanced avatar makes the game play more 
enjoyable, the demand for well-developed avatars and their in-
creasingly powerful possessions creates a market for virtual 
goods. Depending on the game publishers’ terms of service, 
such a market may be allowed or even intended, may be limited 
to in-game trade, or may be forbidden. Increasingly, publishers 
allow and encourage the transfer of avatars between players. 
The increased market value of virtual items gave rise to legal 
discussions and has even led to first legal actions brought to 
national courts.20 
In contrast to some pseudonyms and software agents, ava-
tars are not usually involved in commercial relationships but 
rather in leisure contexts. As such, their legal status is relevant 
in light of the tight emotional bond which physical persons can 
establish with their avatar.21 This raises the question whether, 
for example, defamation of an avatar can occur and, if so, 
whether it has legal consequences. Based on its prior actions, 
an avatar may have a reputation within the virtual world. The 
programs and scripts in control of other avatars could refer to 
this kind of reputation of the avatar to calculate their response 
towards the avatar. Such reputation may even become a factor 
affecting the economic value of the avatar in the physical world. 
Damaging this reputation could cause a monetary loss for the 
player in the physical world, for instance in case he wants to 
                                                          
 18. Id. 
 19. See Nick Yee, The Psychology of Massively Multi-User Online Role-
Playing Games: Motivations, Emotional Investment, Relationships and Prob-
lematic Usage, in  Avatars at Work and Play: Collaboration and Interaction in 
Shared Virtual Environments 187, 189–91, 193–94, 196–98 (Ralph Schroeder 
& Ann-Sofie Axelsson eds., 2006), available at  
http://vhil.stanford.edu/pubs/2006/yee-psychology-mmorpg.pdf. 
 20. See generally Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D. 
Pa., 2007) (concerning the sale of a piece of virtual land). 
 21. See Jacquet-Chiffelle et al., supra note 9, at 96. 
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sell his avatar. This subsequently may constitute a tort and 
could lead to granting a claim for damages. But in contrast to 
reputation, an avatar is not capable of having honor, dignity, or 
self-esteem. Consequently this raises the fundamental question 
as to what exactly is the object of the protection offered by the 
regulations on defamation in different jurisdictions. 
C.  SOFTWARE AGENTS 
In the information society, more and more tasks are facili-
tated, and indeed increasingly performed, by software. As the 
software program becomes more autonomous, we can speak of 
software agents,22 sometimes also referred to as electronic 
agents, intelligent agents or softbots (software robots). 
To illuminate the concept of software agents, it is useful 
first to look at the concept of an agent. Generally speaking the 
term “agent” refers to: (1)an entity capable of action;23 or (2) 
someone (or something) who acts on behalf of another person.24 
In the first, most general sense, the class of agents can be 
divided into biological agents (such as human beings or viruses) 
and non-biological agents, which include both hardware agents 
or robots and software agents. All of these agents are capable of 
action. If the action is performed on behalf of another entity, 
then the agent fits within the second, more restricted, defini-
tion—the agent then functions as a representative of another 
entity. 
If we restrict the notion of action to intentional or auto-
nomous action, not all software qualifies as an agent in the 
sense of an entity capable of action. “Software agents are pro-
grams that react autonomously to changes in their environ-
ment and solve their tasks without any intervention of the us-
er.”25 Because of this characteristic, software agents are 
                                                          
 22. See Software agent – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_agent (last accessed May 2, 2010). 
 23. Cf. Agent – Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/agent (defining an agent as “an active or efficient 
cause” or one that exerts power or produces an effect) (last visited Nov. 20, 
2009). More interesting for our purpose is Latour’s definition of an actor, “any 
thing that [modifies] a state of affairs by making a difference.” BRUNO 
LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-
THEORY 71 (2005). 
 24. Cf. Agent – Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/agent (defining an agent as” a representative who acts 
on behalf of other persons or organizations”). 
 25. Steffen Wettig & Eberhard Zehendner, A Legal Analysis of Human 
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sometimes also called autonomous agents.26 Note that in this 
definition, intention is not required and autonomy is unders-
tood in a very general manner that includes actions of agents 
that are not aware of their own actions and, thus, cannot be 
held morally responsible for them.27 
A further distinction can be made between stationary 
agents and mobile agents. Stationary agents move only in their 
original environment (e.g., their owner’s computer), whereas 
mobile agents “move around (migrate) independently in hetero-
geneous computer networks.”28 Agents can also be classified ac-
cording to their function. There are basically four types of soft-
ware agents: user agents (personal assistants); buyer agents 
(shopbots); monitoring or surveillance agents; and data mining 
agents. 29 
User agents are typically stationary and restricted to per-
sonal use. As a result, they raise fewer questions about duties 
and obligations. Other types of agents, which may be mobile 
and more distant from their owners, present more complex is-
sues. In terms of “distance” from their principal, it is also use-
ful to distinguish three types of agents, depending on the de-
gree of autonomy with which they operate. A slave has no 
autonomy at all. For any decision that affects the possessions, 
legal rights, and obligations of its “master” it has to consult 
him. A representative may take its own decisions within a well-
defined domain and within strict limits. A salesman may make 
its own decisions and is not restricted in the way in which it in-
tends to take care of its user’s interest. It is bound to serve the 
interests its user wants to be taken care of. It may for instance 
manage a stock portfolio belonging to its user. 
                                                          
and Electronic Agents, 12 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND L. 111, 112 (2004) 
[hereinafter Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis]. 
 26. “An autonomous agent is a system situated within and a part of an 
environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit 
of its own agenda and so as to affect what it senses in the future.” Stan Frank-
lin & Art Graesser, Is it an Agent, or just a Program? A Taxonomy for Auto-
nomous Agents, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP 
ON AGENT THEORIES, ARCHITECTURES, AND LANGUAGES 21–35 (Springer-
Verlag 1996). Note that we use the term autonomous in a more restricted 
sense, see infra, Part III.B. 
 27. We shall further explore the nexus of agents, autonomy and person-
hood in Part III, infra. 
 28. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 112. 
 29. Software agent—Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_agent (last visited May 2, 2010). 
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Relatively autonomous software agents are normally re-
lated to physical persons, but at a distance. As such agents de-
velop, the time may come when their actions can no longer be 
seen as the actions of the human beings behind them. Insofar 
as these actions have legal or other consequence, this raises the 
issue of whether and to what extent rights and obligations 
should be attributed to software agents themselves. This is a 
highly relevant question in an information society in which 
these agents become increasingly autonomous. Indeed, if we 
are to believe Willmott, “[I]t might already be possible to create 
wholly independent artificial entities with their own identities, 
financial independence and the ability to exist undetected in 
online human dominated worlds.”30 
D.  ROBOTS 
Long before the notion of software agents emerged, the 
idea of autonomic machines— robots—was already prevalent, 
first in fiction and, with slowly increasing sophistication, in re-
ality.31 Karl Čapek introduced the term “robot” in his 1921 play 
R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), for servant machines look-
ing like humans.32 Most robots in real life are industrial robots 
used, for example, in car and electronics factories, or service 
robots like vacuum-cleaning or lawn-mowing machines. These 
robots are more than just machines in that they usually have 
some sensors for scanning and adapting movements to their 
environment.33 They operate without direct human interven-
tion and appear to have some form of agency. Increasingly, 
these machines are becoming more autonomic, performing 
more complex tasks based on programmed algorithms while 
processing multiple sensory input from their environment. 
Another type of robots emerging is the pet robot. The Ta-
magotchi, developed in the 1990s, was a primitive and briefly 
popular gadget marketed as a pet.34 Apart from such digital 
                                                          
 30. STEVEN WILLMOTT, ILLEGAL AGENTS? CREATING WHOLLY 
INDEPENDENT AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES IN ONLINE WORLDS 8 (2004), available 
at http://www.lsi.upc.edu/dept/techreps/llistat_detallat.php?id=695. 
 31. For a good overview, see Robot—Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robot (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 32. KAREL CAPEK, R.U.R. (ROSSUM’S UNIVERSAL ROBOTS) (Paul Selver 
trans.,1925). 
 33. See, e.g., Roomba-Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roomba (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 34. Tamagotchi – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
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pets, animal-look-alike pets are also being produced. The best-
known pet robot is probably Sony’s Aibo, a robot-dog introduced 
in 1999.35 Paro, a robot seal, for example, is popular in Japan 
as a pet companion, and he is proposed for therapeutic purpos-
es in hospitals.36 
Other types of robots are being developed that begin to look 
more and more like humans. One strand of research is develop-
ing realistic looking robots that mirror human looks.37 Another 
strand looks at distinguishing features that might allow a robot 
to create the perception of human qualities, in particular facial 
expressions like smiling or raising eyebrows.38 If the humanoid 
robot were equipped with artificial intelligence, and thus ac-
quire more autonomy through emergent behavior, we are slow-
ly getting closer to the futuristic vision of an android.39 
Because of the huge potential benefits of automating tasks, 
the first type of robots (industrial and service) will almost cer-
tainly continue to be developed with growing sophistication and 
an increasing level of autonomic functioning. The development 
of animal and human-looking robots will also move forward, 
perhaps with lower levels of autonomic activity than the func-
tional robots because they have a largely social or entertain-
ment function. 
                                                          
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamagotchi (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 35. AIBO, Your Artifical Intelligent Companion, http://support.sony-
europe.com/aibo/ (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 36. Paro Therapeutic Pet, http://www.parorobots.com/ (last visited May 2, 
2010); see also 
Canadian Press, Robot Baby Seals to Replace Cats and Dogs as Pets in Hospit-
als, Nursing Homes, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 12, 2009, available at  
http://www.thestar.com/article/569488. 
 37. See, for example, the work of Hiroshi Ishiguro at 
http://www.is.sys.es.osaka-u.ac.jp/index.en.html (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 38. See, for example, MIT’s Kismet at 
http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/kismet/kismet.html 
(last visited May 2, 2010). 
 39. The best-known example of an android is Data from Star Trek. For 
robots to become more intelligent and social, context-sensitivity seems perti-
nent, which could imply, for example, some form of distributed intelligence 
that emerges less from a single robot than from its interconnectivity (online 
connections with data bases that allow for data mining the data gathered by 
both the robot and other sensors in its environment). This could make it hard 
to identify the robot as a physical entity, as its emergent behavior depends on 
the entire network of interconnected sensors, and online data bases. 
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E.  INCREASING DISTANCE 
To summarize how new acting entities  operate at increas-
ing distance, we propose two open questions that illustrate this 
new paradigm and how this creates problems for legal accoun-
tability. 
The widespread use of persistent pseudonyms on the In-
ternet, for example of an eBay seller or consumer, raises ques-
tions about the link between a transaction and the physical 
person with whom the transaction is made. How do we deal 
with this new reality when, if something goes wrong, no physi-
cal person can be linked with a reasonable amount of effort to 
the transaction? Even if substantive law provides a clear an-
swer as to who is responsible and who should bear the conse-
quences,  which will often but not always be the case with the 
entities discussed, can rights be effectively enforced in practice? 
New forms of unlawful activities take advantage of the gray 
zones, where the law is theoretically applicable but becomes 
very hard to enforce in a globalized cyberworld with entities 
acting at increasing distance. 
In order to assess responsibility, the reason why an action 
took place sometimes has to be determined. Was it done, for ex-
ample, with mens rea? What happens when a non-human enti-
ty acts on behalf of a human being, such as when the human 
being is only indirectly acting at a considerable distance? Can 
non-human entities, like a software agent, be considered to 
have their own will and take independent decisions? 
III.  PERSONS, AGENTS, AND AUTONOMY 
The entities discussed above do not prima facie count as 
“persons”—a term traditionally associated with human beings. 
Yet the legal construct of the non-human legal person shows 
that non-human entities can also count as persons in law. Be-
fore moving into a discussion of new types of legal persons, it 
seems useful to briefly clarify what is meant by “a person,” a 
concept that relates to the concepts of agent and agency. These 
concepts, in turn, relate to varying degrees of automation and 
autonomy, which are also important to distinguish conceptual-
ly. 
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A.  PERSONHOOD AND AGENCY 
To provide some conceptual coherence, we may start with 
Bruno Latour’s salient depiction of what he calls “actants.”40 An 
actant is “any thing that [modifies] a state of affairs by making 
a difference. . . .”41 Any thing can thus be an actant in this very 
broad sense, depending on whether it does or does not make a 
difference. Paraphrasing Peirce’s pragmatist stance on doubt 
(one cannot doubt everything, but we should be willing to doubt 
anything),42 we could say that it makes no sense to qualify eve-
rything as an actant, but we should be willing to qualify any-
thing qualifying as an actant When discussing legal personhood 
for non-human actants, the point should be to investigate at 
what point it makes sense to attribute legal consequence of the 
actants’ actions to the actants themselves, instead of to the 
human actants behind them. In the case of corporations, funds, 
and associations, this question has been answered in detail in 
the positive law of most modern legal systems. To answer this 
question with regard to pseudonyms, avatars, software agents, 
or robots, we need to establish the conditions under which such 
attribution solves problems without creating even greater ones. 
Depending on how novel legal persons are introduced, they 
could, in fact, destabilize familiar notions of responsibility that 
form the moral core of the law, reinforcing undesirable affor-
dances43 of an increasingly independent technological infra-
structure. Instead of reinforcing independent actions of novel 
technologies over which we have little control, one could also 
seek protection in the law against what some would qualify as 
a marginalization of human agency. In this article, we shall not 
assume that technologies are either good or bad, rejecting both 
techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that the emerging proliferation of electronic agents and 
other quasi-autonomous agents challenges the present legal 
framework, requiring an in-depth study of the conditions for le-
gal personhood in an information society. This will require the 
                                                          
 40. LATOUR, supra note 23, at 71. 
 41. Id. See also id. at 52–54. 
 42. HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM, AN OPEN QUESTION  21(1995). 
 43. An affordance can be described as what is afforded by a particular 
technological device or infrastructure. James J. Gibson, THE ECOLOGICAL 
APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION 127–43 (1979). 
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development of a generic vocabulary that takes into account the 
specificities of both the domain of computer science and of law. 
In computer science an agent has been defined as: 
A program that performs some information gathering or processing 
task in the background. Typically, an agent is given a very small and 
well-defined task.44 
Importantly: 
In computer science, there is a school of thought that believes that the 
human mind essentially consists of thousands or millions of agents all 
working in parallel. To produce real artificial intelligence, this school 
holds, we should build computer systems that also contain many 
agents and systems for arbitrating among the agents’ competing re-
sults.45 
Interestingly, in law, an agent is often defined as: 
A person authorized to act for and under the direction of another per-
son when dealing with third parties. The person who appoints an 
agent is called the principal. An agent can enter into binding agree-
ments on the principal’s behalf and may even create liability for the 
principal if the agent causes harm while carrying out his or her du-
ties.46 
What we see here is that both in computer science and in 
law the concept of an agent refers to an entity that is at work 
for somebody (or something) else. In both cases we have a prin-
cipal that determines the objective, task, scope, means, restric-
tions, etc. of the agent that he employs. We will, therefore, refer 
to electronic pseudonyms, avatars, software agents, and robots 
that act or interact with others on behalf of their users/owners 
as “computer agents.” In the present legal framework, a com-
puter agent cannot play the role of a legal agent, because to be 
a legal agent, the computer agent must have legal personhood; 
so far, only natural persons, specific types of companies, associ-
ations, a trust fund, and public bodies have been attributed le-
gal personhood. If a computer agent were to become a legal 
agent, it could conclude contracts in the name of the principal. 
In case the agent lacks proper authority of the principal or the 
principal is non-existent, the contracting partner would be able 
to sue the agent for breach of contract. One could imagine a re-
stricted kind of legal personhood for computer agents, enabling 
                                                          
 44. Agent – Webopedia Computer Dictionary, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/agent.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Definition of Agent – Nolo’s Free Dictionary of Law Terms and Legal 
Definitions, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/agent-term.html (last visited Nov. 
20, 2009). 
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both the user/owner and those interacting with these agents 
more leeway in the handling of their affairs. Insofar as the in-
teractions initiated by computer agents cause serious harm, we 
may want to sustain the possibility to attribute legal responsi-
bility for wrongfulness and mens rea to actants capable of ref-
lection and intentional action. The notion of calling a person to 
account for her actions seems to fall flat on its face if applied to 
contemporary computer agents, and this is one of the issues we 
will investigate in the following section. 
In ethics and philosophy, agency is a term reserved for the 
capability of a person to have intentions and to make conscious 
deliberate choices on the basis of a moral and/or pragmatic 
judgment about what is at stake.47 Even if it makes sense to 
argue that non-human entities act and make a difference, this 
is not meant to suggest that they act on the basis of conscious 
reflection. Insofar as legal liability builds on this notion of 
agency, we need to inquire further into the nature of computer 
agents and decide whether and when they qualify for such 
agency. 
Personhood is not equivalent with agency, though it is ob-
viously related. Again, in different domains, personhood has 
different meanings. In computer games a persona is equivalent 
to an avatar, while in legal theory a persona is often described 
as the mask of legal personhood that allows an entity to act in 
law, while protecting the physical person or other entity behind 
the mask from being equated with its legal role.48 The similari-
ty between a persona/avatar and a legal person can be found in 
the fact that both refer to a role instead of the entirety of a 
physical entity. This, however, does not imply that the usage of 
the term is similar in other ways. An avatar/persona is created 
                                                          
 47. For an overview of the intricacies of the concept of agency in law and 
moral philosophy, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, search results for 
“Agency,” http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=agency (last vi-
sited Nov. 20, 2009). 
 48. This double function of legal personhood has been further developed in 
the relational conception of law that sees law in a constitutional democracy as 
always both instrumental for societal order and protective of individual free-
dom and the freedom to resist dominant frames of interpretation. See R. 
FOQUÉ AND A. C. 'T HART, INSTRUMENTALITEIT EN RECHTSBESCHERMING: 
GRONDSLAGEN VAN EEN STRAFRECHTELIJKE (1990); S. Gutwirth, Waarheid-
saanspraken in recht en rechtswetenschap, Brussel: VUB-press and MAKLU 
(1993); Mireille Hildebrandt, Trial and “Fair Trial”: From Peer to Subject to 
Citizen, in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL 215–37 (Anthony Duff et al.eds., 2006). 
514 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:2 
  
in order to play in a virtual game or roam about in a virtual 
world; contrary to a legal persona it is not created to provide 
legal rights and obligations that allow for legal certainty and 
legal equality. Legal personhood attributes a specific type of 
personhood to an entity. This notion of legal personhood is re-
lated to agency because it enables an entity to act (in law), 
meaning that the law attributes legal consequences to the ac-
tions of the entity. So, if agency refers to an entity’s capacity to 
act, to make a difference, legal personhood refers to the fact 
that this difference generates legal consequences. However, in-
sofar as the law attributes liability for wrongful actions com-
mitted with mens rea, another notion of personhood is at stake. 
This notion of personhood relates to an ethical and philosophi-
cal notion of agency that refers to the capacity to act in the 
sense of intentional meaningful action. Such personhood sug-
gests a sense of self, a capability of standing trial, that is, of be-
ing called to account for one’s actions. 
One of the pertinent issues that is at stake in this article is 
the question when legal personhood should be attributed to ent-
ities devoid of agency in the ethical and philosophical sense of 
being capable of intentional action. The problem with the attri-
bution of legal personhood to such entities (animals, ships, 
trust funds, organizations) is threefold. First, in a court of law 
they will always have to be represented by entities with agency 
(at this point in time that means they need representation by 
human beings). Second, it is difficult, if not impossible, to es-
tablish liability for intentional wrong-doing or criminal guilt in 
the case of an entity without such agency, which usually means 
that in those cases the liability of other legal subjects (with 
such agency) needs to be established.49 Third, the attribution of 
legal personhood could entail an appeal to human rights on be-
half of the novel legal person, which would be problematic if 
this entity is not capable of self-reflection. 
B.  AUTOMATIC, AUTONOMIC, AND AUTONOMOUS AGENTS 
At this point, it is important to make some conceptual dis-
tinctions between different levels of automation and autonomy. 
                                                          
 49. For an interesting brainstorm on the legal personhood of personae 
without agency, see Posting of Bob Blakley to Burton Group Blogs: Identity 
and Privacy, 
http://identityblog.burtongroup.com/bgidps/2006/11/the_limited_lia.html (Nov. 
17, 2006); Chris Swan’s Weblog, Persona, 
http://thestateofme.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/persona/ (Jan. 9, 2008). 
KOOPS_MACROS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  3:14 PM 
2010] BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 515 
 
For this purpose, we will distinguish between automatic, auto-
nomic, and autonomous agents. Automatic agents refer to the 
traditional association of automation with mechanical, non-
creative applications that perform one or more actions auto-
matically, i.e. in a predefined manner. In software programs, 
automation builds on the application of an algorithm that de-
fines the behavior of the program. Autonomic agents refer to 
some of the entities discussed above that have the capacity to 
initiate a change in their own program in order to better 
achieve a certain goal. The program’s actions are not entirely 
predictable, not defined in a closed manner and can thus be 
said to be underdetermined. Autonomic behavior does not en-
tail consciousness or self-consciousness. Autonomous agents re-
fer to those having the capacity to determine their own objec-
tives as well as the rules and principles that guide their 
interactions. Auto (Greek for self) and Nomos (Greek for law) 
refers to an entity capable of living up to its own law. An auto-
nomous agent in this sense is an agent in the traditional ethical 
and philosophical sense of the term, requiring both conscious-
ness and self-consciousness, i.e., the capacity to reflect upon 
one’s actions and to engage in intentional action. Self-
consciousness as the precondition for autonomous action is typ-
ical of human agency. So far, machines have not developed con-
sciousness,50 let alone self-consciousness,51 while animals with 
a central nervous system do have consciousness but lack the 
type of self-consciousness that enables reflection and delibera-
tion.52 Such self-consciousness depends, among other things, on 
                                                          
 50. In the cognitive sciences, there is a lively debate over whether ma-
chine consciousness is possible, how we could design it, and how we could 
detect it. Leading AI philosophers like Daniel Dennett, who endorse a compu-
tationalist understanding of the human mind, see no inherent obstructions to 
assume machine consciousness is possible, whereas other philosophers within 
the field of cognitive sciences, like Searle, take a more prudent approach. For 
an overview, see MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS (Owen Holland ed., 2003). 
 51. Note that some philosophers, notably Dennett, argue that self-
consciousness—if not consciousness itself—is an illusion. This raises the ques-
tion of the relationship between first person experience and scientific inquiry. 
For a collection of essays discussing this and other related issues see 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (David Woodruff Smith & Amie 
L. Thomasson eds., Oxford University Press 2005). 
 52. For a discussion regarding whether there is continuity or discontinui-
ty between humans and other animals in this respect, see generally Tobias 
Cheung, The Language Monopoly: Plessner on Apes, Humans and Expressions, 
26 LANGUAGE & COMMUNICATION 316 (2006);  Frans De Wall, GOOD 
NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER 
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the externalization and constitution of thoughts by means of 
symbolic language. Although at present self-conscious ma-
chines do not exist, we cannot be sure whether – and if so, 
when – machines will develop the type of self-consciousness 
that allows for autonomous action. 
IV.  REVIEWING THE LITERATURE: ATTRIBUTING 
LEGAL PERSONHOOD? 
Legal personhood indicates the capability to be a subject of 
rights and duties. Within the present legal framework all hu-
mans have been attributed legal personhood. It is granted by 
Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
194853 and Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights of 196654 to all (living)55 human beings. 
The drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) did not provide a similar clause, as they held it to be 
too trivial and self-evident to include a provision on legal per-
sonhood of humans. 56 
All Western legal systems grant legal personhood not only 
to humans, but also to what is called legal persons. Those are 
legal entities such as associations of persons, a trust, or even a 
ship that can act in law as if they were a single person. To pro-
tect trade from incapable or fraudulently acting entities, strin-
gent requirements usually apply with regard to publicity of the 
incorporation act, encompassing mandatory requirements as to 
formal registration procedures in public registers and mostly 
some kind of minimum capitalization.57 This kind of legal per-
sonhood, as opposed to the legal personhood of humans, is not 
                                                          
ANIMALS (1996). 
 53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. 
 55. For a comparison of the fuzzy borderline at the very beginning of life 
in German, English, American, French, and Spanish law, see J.T. MAHR, DER 
BEGINN DER RECHTSFÄHIGKEIT UND DIE ZIVILRECHTLICHE STELLUNG 
UNGEBORENEN LEBENS: EINE RECHTS VERGLEICHENDE BETRACHTUNG (2006). 
 56. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at  
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20213/volume-213-I-
2889-English.pdf. 
 57. For an example of such requirements for business corporations, see 
MINN. STAT. § 302A (2009). 
KOOPS_MACROS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  3:14 PM 
2010] BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 517 
 
attributed by means of international treaties, but rather de-
termined by national law. 
Within legal philosophy, moral personhood is often seen as 
precondition for legal personhood, building on French’s seminal 
article on the moral personhood of corporations.58 French dis-
cusses why conglomerates, like corporations, should be treated 
as full moral persons, whereas aggregates, such as lynch mobs, 
do not qualify as such.59 French distinguishes between meta-
physical, moral, and legal persons, pointing out that for many 
authors legal personhood depends on metaphysical and/or mor-
al personhood. Obviously, current positive law does not agree 
with this position, since no serious argument can be made that 
a ship or a trust fund is either a metaphysical or a moral per-
son. We therefore refer to the idea that legal personhood is at-
tributed to enable an entity to act in law (e.g., to create legal 
consequences) and to be held accountable for its actions, while 
also protecting the entity itself from being equated with the 
role it plays. Currently, all entities besides humans and those 
legal persons recognized by law are considered to be legal ob-
jects. This framework also applies to animals, which are 
treated as objects of the rights of their owners in private law, 
despite an ongoing movement by animal law activists.60 
As computer agents operate at increasing distance from 
their owners, resulting in an accountability gap, various au-
thors have discussed the question whether new entities could 
or should also be attributed legal personhood. If companies and 
associations can be legal persons, why not software agents, as 
well? In this section, we provide a review of what we consider 
the most seminal published literature on this question in the 
                                                          
 58. Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 
207 (1979) (suggesting that qualifying an entity as a moral person does not 
depend on positive law, whereas qualifying as a legal person obviously does). 
 59. See Raymond S. Pfeiffer, The Central Distinction in the Theory of Cor-
porate Moral Personhood, 9 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 473 (1990) (discussing French’s 
argument and claiming it is flawed). 
 60. See Jane Goodall & Steven M. Wise, Are Chimpanzees Entitled to 
Fundamental Legal Rights?, 3 Animal L. 61 (1997) (arguing that animals 
should have the right to things such as bodily integrity and bodily liberty and 
that such rights should not be denied simply because they have not been 
granted in the past).For an historical overview of animal rights in continental 
and common law systems, see Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Sub-
jects, of Rights (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 171 2002). 
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past two decades.61 
A.  SETTING THE STAGE: SOLUM (1992) 
In a ground-breaking article, Lawrence Solum discussed 
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences.62 Though technol-
ogical devices and infrastructures have developed dramatically 
since he wrote his article, his comprehensive approach is equal-
ly relevant today, and we will follow his arguments to see how 
they can inform us of the conditions under which and the ex-
tent to which it makes sense to attribute legal personhood to 
automatic or autonomic devices or even to non-human auto-
nomous persons. 
Solum does not speak of computer agents but of artificial 
intelligences (AIs). Apart from the pseudonyms, the computer 
agents described above would qualify as an AI in Solum’s 
terms. At the time he wrote his article, AI was at least as con-
troversial as it is now.63 In speaking of AI, we do not take sides 
in the debate of whether non-human intelligence is a contradic-
tio in terminis. We will follow Solum’s pragmatic approach, 
avoiding questions such as “whether artificial intelligence is 
                                                          
 61. Note that much of this literature takes a common-law perspective, but 
the arguments are usually sufficiently general to be valid for continental legal 
traditions as well. 
Within the scope of this article, we cannot go into all literature written on the 
subject. We refer interested readers to additional views expressed in, inter 
alia, D. Bourcier, De l'intelligence artificielle à la personne virtuelle: émergence 
d'une entité juridique?, 49 DROIT ET SOCIÉTÉ 847 (2001); Emily M. Weitzen-
boeck, Electronic Agents and the Formation of Contracts, 9 INT’L J. OF L. AND 
INFO. TECH. 204 (2001); R. George Wright The Pale Cast of Thought: on the 
Legal Status of Sophisticated Androids, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 297 (2001); S. Cho-
pra and L. White, Artificial Agents - Personhood in Law and Philosophy,  
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
635–39 (2004); W. Al-Majid, Electronic Agents and Legal Personality: Time to 
Treat Them as Human Beings, in Proceedings of the 2007 Annual BILETA 
Conference, Hertfordshire, 16–17 April, 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Electronic%20Agents%20and
%20Legal% (last visited March 17, 2009). 
 62. Solum, supra note 3. 
 63. For a relevant discussion of subsequent paradigms in AI, see 
FRANCISCO J. VARELA ET AL., THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND 
HUMAN EXPERIENCE (1991) (arguing for the application of cognitive science to 
human concerns regarding the body as both a lived, experiential structure and 
as the vehicle for cognitive mechanisms), and KATHERINE N. HAYLES, HOW WE 
BECAME POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BODIES IN CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND 
INFORMATICS (1999) (describing the separation of information from its materi-
al form and investigating how such a phenomena can provide insights into the 
fate of embodiment in technological based world). 
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possible.” Instead of entering metaphysical debates about the 
nature of intelligence, his essay “explores those questions 
through a series of thought experiments that transform theo-
retical questions of whether artificial intelligence is possible in-
to legal questions such as, “Could an artificial intelligence serve 
as a trustee?”64 He suggests that translating questions about AI 
in a concrete legal context will act as a pragmatic Occam’s ra-
zor,65 because the law allows us to detect the practical implica-
tions of providing legal personhood for smart technologies. 
1.  Personhood for Non-humans: A Legal Fiction? 
Referring to John Chipman Gray’s The Nature and Sources 
of the Law, written at the beginning of the 20th century, Solum 
recounts the traditional idea that legal personhood for non-
humans involves a fiction unless the entity can be said to have 
“intelligence” and “will.”66 In order to avoid controversial terms 
like “will” and “intelligence,” Solum investigates whether an AI 
could serve as a trustee (perform complex actions) or claim con-
stitutional rights and liberties (assuming intentionality and 
consciousness). 
Solum thus redefines the conditions for legal personhood in 
terms of the capacity to perform complex actions and/or the ca-
pacity to act intentionally and with (self-)consciousness.67 The 
second capacity seems to comply with the traditional idea 
shared by many lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists that per-
sonhood implies the capacity to act in a deliberate way. We 
                                                          
 64. Solum, supra note 3, at 1232. 
 65. Occam’s razor is a “principle stated by William of Ockham (1285–
1347/49), a scholastic, that Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plural-
ity should not be posited without necessity.” The principle gives precedence to 
simplicity; of two competing theories, the simplest explanation of an entity is 
to be preferred. See Encyclopedia Britannica, Ockham’s Razor, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor (last vi-
sited Nov. 20, 2009). Solum here refers to this principle because he wants to 
avoid complicated metaphysical debates about what is “intelligence,” “agency,” 
“personhood,” etc. 
 66. Solum, supra note 3, at 1238 n.26; John C. Gray, THE NATURE AND 
SOURCES OF THE LAW (Roland Gray ed., 2d ed. 1921) (1909). See also French, 
supra note 58 (discussing what types of corporate entities qualify for moral 
and legal personhood). 
 67. We note that Solum does not discriminate between consciousness and 
self-consciousness, often using the term “consciousness” to refer to self-
consciousness. As explained supra Part III.B on autonomic behavior and auto-
nomous action, we think this to be a crucial difference. 
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should note, however, that legal personhood is often attributed 
to entities that do not qualify for such personhood. Legal theory 
refers to this as a legal fiction: the law attributes personhood 
though in “normal” life we would not think of the relevant enti-
ty as a person. Ironically, the traditional idea that legal per-
sonhood for non-humans is a legal fiction has been challenged 
by Tom Allen and Robin Widdison.68 In fact, they claim that in-
sofar as contracts are initiated, negotiated, and concluded by 
autonomous computers,69 this attribution would imply a legal 
fiction if the legal consequences of these actions were attributed 
to the owners or users of these computers. Insofar as they are 
not even aware of the contracts being concluded, it would be fic-
titious to pretend they concluded the contracts. This position is 
not contrary to Solum’s. He argues for a pragmatic approach to 
legal personhood: for him the question of whether we need legal 
personhood is empirically dependent on the measure of inde-
pendence of the artificial intelligence he discusses. Such inde-
pendence depends on the capability to perform complex actions 
(reducing the need for human intervention) and – in the case of 
claiming constitutional rights and liberties – on the capability 
to have conscious intentions. 
In the next section, we will discuss whether an AI can 
serve as a trustee (whether it has the capacity to perform com-
plex actions), and in the following section we will discuss 
whether AIs can claim constitutional rights and liberties (as-
suming intentionality and consciousness). The discussion of AIs 
acting as a trustee is relevant for the question of granting a re-
stricted form of legal personhood to computer agents in order to 
bridge the accountability gap in cases that do not depend on the 
attribution of guilt or wrongfulness. The discussion of AIs 
claiming constitutional rights and liberties is relevant for 
granting full legal personhood, bridging the accountability gap 
in the case of criminal liability for harm caused, and facing the 
issue of whether this implies that these entities have funda-
mental (post)human rights. 
                                                          
 68. Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 26 (1996). 
 69. Allen and Widdison speak of “autonomous” computers, whereas we 
would qualify these computers as autonomic devices; cf. supra, Part III.B. 
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2.  Acting as a Trustee: The Capacity to Perform Complex 
Actions 
To test whether an AI could perform the type of complex 
actions that are required for legal personhood, Solum describes 
three stages ofexpert systems in the management of a trust.70 
The first stage involves an expert system that advises a human 
trustee to invest in publicly traded stocks, to pay the benefi-
ciary monthly, and to fill in the forms for tax returns. The ac-
tual performance of day-to-day tasks is largely automated, but 
the human trustee makes all the final decisions. The second 
stage concerns an expert system that begins to outperform the 
human trustee as an investor, leading the settler to decide to 
include instructions in the terms of the trust to the effect that 
the human trustee must follow the advice of the expert system. 
The role of the human trustee diminishes and the number of 
trusts that the expert system can handle increases exponential-
ly. All routine interventions of the human trustee (e.g., in the 
case she is frequently sued by a beneficiary) are taken over by 
the expert system, producing letters that need only a signature 
of the human trustee. The third stage begins when the settlor 
decides to remove the human trustee because he wishes to save 
money or because he does not trust the human not to embezzle 
funds. This third stage begs the question: who owns the expert 
system? If it were a legal person it could claim an ownership 
right to the hardware and software that allow it to operate, but 
since expert programs have no legal subjectivity under contem-
porary law, the hardware and software are probably owned by 
another legal person, e.g., a company. Having introduced these 
three stages, Solum raises the legal question: can an AI become 
                                                          
 70. A trust is a legal instrument in common law. It is defined as ‘“a fidu-
ciary relationship with respect to property subjecting the person by whom the 
title to property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the 
benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an in-
tention to create it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). The trus-
tee is the legal person who administers the trust (investing trust assets, and 
so forth). The beneficiary is the person for whom the trust is maintained, for 
example, the person who receives income from the trust. The settlor is the 
person who establishes the trust. The terms of the trust are the directives to 
the trustee in the document or instrument creating the trust. Solum, supra 
note 3, at 1240. In the continental legal tradition the function of trust is per-
formed by several institutions . The one Solum refers to might be closest to 
that of a foundation. 
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a legal person and function as a trustee.71 For the sake of the 
argument, he assumes that the trust does not raise complex 
moral or aesthetic issues and that it gives the trustee very little 
discretion. He also assumes that the expert system can make 
sound investments, take care of automatic payments, and rec-
ognize events such as the death of the beneficiary which re-
quire a change of action.72 He then pins down the issue to the 
question of “whether the AI is competent to administer the 
trust.” Against the idea that an AI could serve as a trustee, he 
anticipates two objections: (1) the responsibility objection and 
(2) the judgment objection.73 
i.  The Responsibility Objection 
The thrust of the responsibility objection is that the expert 
system could not compensate the trust and cannot be punished 
if it violates legal obligations like the exercise of reasonable 
skill and care in investing the trusts assets or if the expert sys-
tem embezzles trust assets. Presently, the manufacturer of the 
system can be held liable on the basis of product liability. Can 
we imagine the system itself to be held liable? How could it 
compensate for damages? Solum suggests the system could be 
insured, but admits that civil liability for intentional wrong-
doing or criminal liability is hard to imagine in the case of an 
expert system.74 In response to the objection, Solum discusses 
the reasons for punishment.75 He argues that if deterrence is 
the reason for punishment, one could claim that since expert 
systems can be designed in a way that makes it incapable of 
stealing or embezzling, there is simply no need for punishment. 
On the other hand, if desert or retribution is the reason for pu-
nishment, one could claim that non-human entities are not ca-
pable of the moral judgment that is required if one is to 
attribute desert and retribution. Finally, if punishment is a 
learning process, Solum cannot imagine which punitive action 
could communicate censure to the program. He thus concludes 
that using civil liability legal personhood for an expert system 
could work for as far as the system can be insured for its liabili-
                                                          
 71. Solum, supra note 3, at 1243. 
 72. Id. at 1243–44. 
 73. Id. at 1244. 
 74. Id. at 1245. 
 75. Id. at 1245–48. 
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ty.76 As to criminal liability or civil liability for intentional 
wrongdoing, he finds that liability is hard to imagine.77 
ii.  The Judgment Objection 
The thrust of the judgment objection is that an expert sys-
tem will always consist of a complex system of rules, which 
does not allow the system to make judgments in the sense of 
exercising discretion. The objection is played out in three ver-
sions. First, it is argued that an AI cannot cope with a change 
of legally relevant circumstances; second, it is argued that an 
AI cannot make the moral choices it may encounter; and third, 
it is argued that an AI cannot make some of the legal choices it 
will face.78 In all three versions, the problem is that, even in the 
case of parallel distributed algorithms, an expert system cannot 
do anything but follow rules.79 As to the first argument, expert 
systems seem to lack the kind of common sense needed to solve 
unexpected problems. As to the second argument, expert sys-
tems seem to lack the sense of fairness that is warranted when 
unexpected circumstances require overruling the letter of a rule 
in order to serve its purpose. As to the third argument, expert 
systems seem to lack the ability to take the necessary action if 
called to account in a court of law.80 Solum concludes that AIs 
presently do not have the capacity to perform the duties of a 
trustee, especially in the case of unexpected circumstances af-
fecting the trust.81 He raises the question whether a more li-
mited form of legal personhood could be designed, allowing an 
AI to serve as a limited purpose trustee and/or for simple trusts 
whose operation can be fully automatic.82 In that case, the 
terms of the trust will need to specify a human take-over when-
ever unanticipated circumstances rule out automatic beha-
vior.83 We note that Solum seems to restrict himself here to au-
tomatic devices. Where autonomic computing is concerned, it 
seems that responsiveness to changed circumstances is part of 
its definition: even if the system cannot but follow rules, it is 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 1248. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 1248–49. 
 79. Id. at 1248. 
 80. See id. at 1249–51. 
 81. Id. at 1250. 
 82. Id. at 1253. 
 83. Id. 
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supposed to be capable of adjusting the rules that determine its 
performance. The first objection may thus fail in the case of au-
tonomic devices. As to the third objection, this also applies to 
corporations and funds to which legal personhood has been at-
tributed. This leaves the second objection as the only real objec-
tion with regard to autonomic computer agents. 
iii.  Limited Personhood: Who is the Real Trustee? 
In the case of limited personhood, the terms of the trust 
could stipulate that a natural person should take over in case 
discretionary judgment requiring normative evaluation is 
needed. This raises the question of who is the real trustee in 
such a situation.84 Why attribute limited personhood if in the 
end the real decisions have to be taken by a delegated or subs-
tituted natural person? This objection can be read in two ways. 
First, one can take  it to mean that it is an essential quality of a 
trustee to have the ability to make discretionary decisions. Al-
ternatively, one can take it as implying that the ability to make 
such decisions is just a practical corollary of trusteeship—
someone has to decide at some point on unforeseen issues.85 So-
lum rejects the first reading as unnecessarily “essentialist.” 
The second reading, however, allows Solum to conclude that 
the added value of providing a form of legal personhood to a 
non-human stems from the fact that most decisions are routine 
rather than discretionary, and it may seldom be necessary to go 
back to a natural person for a discretionary decision, thus mak-
ing the AI function as trustee for most practical purposes.86 
Therefore, there is added value in economic terms: it may be 
cheaper to employ an AI as a trustee whenever routine han-
dling of affairs suffices, while the risk that an AI embezzles or 
frauds is practically non-existent.87 
3.  Posthuman Rights and Liberties: The Capacity for 
Intentional Action and (Self-)Consciousness 
Next, Solum discusses whether an AI could claim constitu-
tional rights and liberties,88 an issue closely related to the 
question of autonomous action and agency in traditional ethical 
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1253–54. 
 86. Id. at 1254–55. 
 87. Id. at 1253–54. 
 88. Id. at 1256–79. 
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and philosophical discourse. We will follow his argument as it 
may clarify some of the issues raised in the previous sections. 
We should keep in mind that Solum was writing at a moment 
when autonomic computing was hardly dreamt of, whereas to-
day it looms just across the horizon. The scenario on which So-
lum’s question builds is one of relatively independent artificial 
agents that function as a kind of human-machine-interface 
(HMI) that locates relevant information for a human person, 
for instance in her professional life. Considering their compu-
ting power, they are capable of intelligent mining of a know-
ledge domain and of knowledge management far beyond the 
reach of the human brain. As Solum writes, these HMIs seem 
to have a “mind of their own.”89 He then advances the idea that 
at some point in time these independent AIs could claim consti-
tutional rights like free speech and the right not to be subject to 
involuntary servitude, meaning they would resist being owned 
by another person. 
The question Solum wishes to raise is “whether we ought 
to give an AI constitutional rights, in order to protect its per-
sonhood for the AI’s own sake.”90 We rephrase this question as 
the issue of whether computer agents would qualify for a claim 
to what we will call posthuman rights and liberties, suggesting 
that at some point fundamental human rights like privacy, due 
process, and bodily integrity may be claimed by and/or attri-
buted to non-human agents. By calling them posthuman rights 
and liberties, we refer to the existing category of human rights 
and liberties; by calling them posthuman, we acknowledge that 
they would apply, for instance, to non-biological machines, cy-
borgs, or synthetic biological entities, while also acknowledging 
that this may require us to rethink the meaning of existing 
human rights.91 Solum again raises three kinds of objections. 
First, one could argue that only natural persons qualify for con-
stitutional rights of personhood. Second, one could insist that 
AIs lack some critical aspect of personhood. Third, one could 
suggest that since AIs are human creations, they can never be 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 1256. 
 90. Id. at 1258. 
 91. At this point we do not move into the discussion of whether such post-
human rights concern only first-generation (individual) rights or also second-
generation (social) rights. We rather assume that a society of post-humans 
may require further generations of fundamental rights. 
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more than human property.92 Though it may seem cumbersome 
to investigate these objections, we nevertheless take time to 
explain them, as well as Solum’s response. We think that an 
adequate answer to the question of whether computer agents 
qualify for legal personhood will benefit from a serious consid-
eration of these objections. To be sure, there may be more as-
pects that affect the question of whether full legal personhood 
can be attributed. We should point out that Solum’s points re-
gard neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for full legal 
personhood, but any discussion of this matter must at least ad-
dress the objections that Solum has put on the agenda. 
i.  The Natural Person Objection 
Though one could claim that some constitutional rights 
should be restricted to human persons, we must acknowledge 
that specific constitutional rights (like the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause in the U.S. Bill of Rights) 
already apply to non-human legal persons, while corporations 
also have a right to freedom of expression.93 The objection, 
however, maintains that, in those cases, the non-human legal 
person is no more than a place-holder for the rights of natural 
persons.94 A more fundamental argument against constitution-
al rights for non-humans holds that the concept of person is in-
trinsically linked to humans. The idea is that, since non-
humans do not share our biological constitution, they cannot be 
conceptualized as persons.95 Solum counters this point by ar-
guing that the just because today we cannot imagine non-
humans to qualify for personhood, does not imply that, in the 
future, AIs could not develop into non-biological entities that 
are intelligent, conscious, and feeling in ways that change our 
very concept of personhood.96 We add that the advent of cyborgs 
and synthetic biology blurs the border between biological and 
non-biological entities. Cyborgs, defined as humans enhanced 
with implants that, for instance, change brain functioning, 
seem to introduce a continuum between non-biological robots 
and human-machine hybrids. Following Solum’s argument we 
may expect non-biological embodiment, as well as cyborg em-
                                                          
 92. Solum, supra note 3, at 1258–79. 
 93. Id. at 1258–59. 
 94. Id. at 1259. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1260. 
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bodiments, to provoke novel conceptions of personhood.97 Final-
ly, socio-biological and utilitarian arguments that it is not in 
our interest to grant constitutional personhood to AIs because 
they may take over seem to miss the point: they assume that 
moral obligations are only in play between humans. They ig-
nore the fact that the ability of AIs to take over this would cer-
tainly not depend on us granting them any rights.98 If we build 
machines that develop intelligence, consciousness, and feeling, 
Solum seems to suggest, we take the risk of entering a new so-
ciety of both human and non-human persons. 
ii.  The Missing-Something Objection 
This argument basically evolves as follows: something (the 
soul, consciousness, intentionality, feelings, interests, free 
wills) is essential for personhood.99 As no AI can have this 
“something,” the simple fact that a computer could simulate 
having this something does not mean it actually does have it. 
Since having this “something” determines humans as persons, 
non-humans cannot be persons.100 
Regarding the argument of non-humans not having a soul, 
Solum explains that, insofar as this is a theological argument, 
it cannot determine the attribution of legal personhood: in a 
pluralist, society legal or political arguments need to be based 
on public reason, i.e., reasons that people from all different re-
ligious or non-religious beliefs can accept.101 Insofar as the ar-
gument builds on a Cartesian duality between material causal-
ity and mental freedom, he finds it inextricably wound up in 
                                                          
 97. Compare the cyborg sense of self, described in KEVIN WARWICK, I, 
CYBORG 260, 264 (2002), and  Kevin Warwick, Implants and Cyborgs: The En-
vironment and the Self, in IDEM-IDENTITY AND IPSE-IDENTITY IN PROFILING 
PRACTICES, 52-54 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/profiling/#c2468 (last visited Apr. 
28, 2009). 
 98. Solum, supra note 3, at 1261. 
 99. What this “something” is has been debated ever since the AI commu-
nity began to take seriously the objection that computation and manipulation 
of symbols cannot explain human self-consciousness. See, e.g. VARELA ET AL., 
supra note 63; HAYLES, supra note 63. For interesting overviews, see Holland, 
supra note 50,  Woodruff Smith & Thomasson, supra note 51, and, seminally, 
STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD, THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEBATE: FALSE 
STARTS, REAL FOUNDATIONS (1988). 
 100. Solum, supra note 3, at 1262. 
 101. Id. at 1262–63. 
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the pitfalls of an untenable dualism.102 Regarding the argu-
ment that non-humans are not capable of possessing con-
sciousness, Solum explains that if AIs are in fact incapable of 
having self-consciousness, they would not be capable of expe-
riencing their own lives as good or evil, nor could they develop 
goals. According to Solum, goals, or ends, are a precondition for 
being a right-holder.103 However, the question of whether AIs 
are capable of developing self-consciousness is an empirical 
question.104 Though at this moment consciousness seems re-
stricted to biological beings, this in itself does not preclude the 
possibility of non-biological consciousness.105 The empirical 
question is complicated because a computer may simulate hav-
ing consciousness, as a strategy to successfully claim constitu-
tional rights, but this still does not rule out altogether that AIs 
may one day convince us of their self-consciousness. We would 
suggest that if AIs could in fact simulate consciousness as a 
strategy to claim constitutional rights, one would be tempted to 
infer that they have at least some kind of consciousness. Re-
garding the argument of non-humans not being capable of pos-
sessing intentionality, Solum explains that intentionality refers 
to “meaning.” Just like a thermostat may seem to “know” 
whether it is too hot or too cold in a room, an AI may seem to 
know which stocks to buy. However, this “knowledge” does not 
imply even the faintest idea of the meaning of hot and cold or 
expensive and cheap.106 So far, AIs seems to excel in syntactics, 
without having a clue as to the semantics of what they are 
“doing.” The argument would be that as long as computers can-
not give “meaning” to their own life, it makes no sense to 
attribute constitutional rights.107 However, like in the case of 
consciousness, Solum argues that we cannot preclude AIs from 
developing meaning.108 Regarding the argument that non-
                                                          
 102. Id. at 1263. 
 103. Id. at 1264–65. 
 104. See id. at 1266. 
 105. See id. at 1265–66. 
 106. Id. at 1268. 
 107. Giving meaning to one’s life refers to the fact that humans are “sym-
bolic” animals, whose cognition is mediated by natural language. This lan-
guage has semantical, syntactical and pragmatic dimensions, whereas com-
puter language is limited to a syntactical and (in the case of decision systems) 
pragmatic dimension. A computer agent does not “understand” what it is 
doing in the symbolic terms associated with the notion of “giving meaning to 
one’s life.” 
 108. See Solum, supra note 3, at 1269. 
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humans cannot possess feelings, Solum discusses the expe-
rience of emotions, desires, pleasures, and pain.109 Though he 
has some doubts about whether personhood depends on having 
feelings, he moves on to discuss what if emotions, pain, and 
pleasure were to be essential for the attribution of person-
hood.110 The argument then develops similarly as in the case of 
consciousness and intentionality: it may be that having feelings 
depends on our biological constitution, but it may also be the 
case that in the future AIs will develop feelings, though these 
feelings will be embodied differently from ours. In that case, he 
sees no reason to deny personhood for an AI.111 Regarding the 
argument that non-humans cannot possess interests, defined 
as an interest in the good life, Solum discusses the utilitarian 
idea that the good life is defined as maximizing pleasures and 
minimizing pain.112 In that case, the question of whether AIs 
can have interests equates with the question of whether they 
have feelings.113 However, if one takes a more objective and 
public perspective on interests, like John Finnis does, for ex-
ample, the question is whether an AI can flourish by including 
goods such as “life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, 
friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion.”114 Solum 
contends that, even if AIs will not have a life in the biological 
sense, they might lay claim to a life in which goods like know-
ledge, play, friendship, etc. can be realized.115 Moreover, if liv-
ing in a pluralist society implies that we accept alternative con-
ceptions of the good life, we should make room for radically 
different ways of conceptualizing the good life, for which the at-
tribution of personhood is, in fact, a precondition.116 Regarding 
                                                          
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1270. Solum seems to agree with Kant that all rational beings 
qualify for personhood, irrespective of whether they have feelings. He also re-
fers to Aaron Sloman’s argument that any system with multiple goals requires 
a control system, with emotions achieving just that in the case of human be-
ings. This seems to be confirmed by research demonstrating that intelligent 
people with brain-damage that reduces their capacity to be emotional can give 
multiple arguments for any course of action but remain incapable of making 
decisions. 
 111. See id. at 1271. 
 112. Id. at 1272. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1272 n.146 (citing JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS 85–90 (1980). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1272. 
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the argument that non-humans cannot possess free wills,117 be-
ing the precondition for autonomous action, Solum explains 
that insofar as AIs are merely an instrument to execute the 
free will of a human being, they could not qualify for person-
hood.118 The argument thus focuses on the issue of whether an 
AI could ever act beyond the instructions (the program) of the 
human that designed it. Are the actions of an AI entirely me-
chanical, or could we imagine them as capable of conscious de-
liberation, reasoning, and planning?119 Again, this is an empiri-
cal question: we cannot preclude the possibility that AIs will 
develop a mind of their own, capable of conscious reflection, de-
liberation, and planning. The fact that we could use a mechani-
cal device to overrule an AI that does not obey our instructions, 
would not be, by itself, an argument against the attribution of 
personhood.120 It could be that this device is used precisely be-
cause the AI has developed its own reasons and plans. Such a 
device would be like the discipline or punishment we exercise 
over other human beings, depriving them of the exercise of 
their free will rather than assuming they do not have free will 
to begin with. We would like to add that autonomic computing 
implies that the relevant digital agents act beyond the instruc-
tions or algorithms of their human designer or user. This, how-
ever, does not imply that they have self-consciousness and plan 
                                                          
 117. Within the cognitive sciences some authors claim that ‘free will’ is an 
illusion anyway. See, e.g., DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS 
WILL passim (2002). Though it seems obvious that much of our behavior is au-
tonomic, this does not imply that there is no room for deliberate(d) action. In 
fact it seems obvious that our tacit forms of behavior are often learned beha-
vior, initiated by conscious deliberation with others. The discussion whether, 
and to what extent, free will is an illusion relates to the issue of determinism 
and voluntarism. Rather than embracing either of these extremes, we will 
presume that human action is underdetermined due to its mediation by natu-
ral language that allows us to externalize our thoughts and reflect upon them. 
This does not imply a mentalistic free will, nor a physicalist determinism; it 
remains agnostic as to the actual extent of our freedom. It must be clear, how-
ever that to hold a person accountable on the basis of culpable and wrongful 
action, a court must decide that this person has a measure of freedom to act 
otherwise. If this is denied, the attribution of rights and liberties in law makes 
no sense anyway. 
 118. Solum, supra note 3, at 1273. 
 119. Solum  refers to the idea that human actions are not caused, meaning 
that free will is not subject to the laws of causation. But he rejects this as an 
implausible proposition, suggesting instead that “an action is free if it is 
caused in the right way, through conscious reasoning and deliberation.” Id. at 
1273. 
 120. Id. at 1274. 
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or deliberate consciously about different courses of action. We 
must discriminate between autonomic and autonomous action. 
Both imply creative and partly unpredictable interactions, but 
autonomic action does not imply self-consciousness or the ca-
pacity for reflection that is at stake in autonomous action. 
Summing up, in the case of souls and interests, Solum ar-
gues that the pluralism of our society should prevent us from 
imposing our own conceptions on spiritual matters or the good 
life on emerging AIs. In the case of consciousness, intentionali-
ty, feelings, and free will, we should let empirical evidence de-
cide the matter. As to the latter, Solum turns to the objection 
that we may apply the Turing test to AIs and find that they be-
have as persons,121 while in fact they are only simulating.122 He 
points out that to make the distinction between the simulation 
of a person and the actual being of a person, behavioral evi-
dence of great syntactical abilities would perhaps not be suffi-
cient.123 
iii.  The Objection That AIs Should Be Property 
This objection refers to Locke’s proposition that artifacts 
that are the product of human labor are the property of those 
who made them.124 For Locke, a human being is not made by 
his parents, but by God, implying that a parent does not have 
ultimate control over his children. Solum rejects this theologi-
cal argument and asserts that we believe in personhood for all 
human beings, even if they are made by their parents.125 The 
                                                          
 121. The so-called Turing Test was proposed by Alan Turing in his paper 
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950). Turing suggests 
that if a person sitting behind a computer screen cannot detect the difference 
between the answers generated by a digital computer and those of a human 
person, this proves that the computer can think. For John Searle’s refutation 
of the Turing Test, see John R. Searle, Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Pro-
gram?, SCI. AM., Jan. 1990, at 26. 
 122. This is Searle’s Chinese Room argument, discussed by Solum, supra 
note 3, at 1236–38. It concerns the fact that a computer makes its inferences 
on the basis of syntactical correlations, without any semantic reference. 
Though the inferences could allow the computer to pass the Turing test, this 
would merely indicate that the computer can simulate a person, not that the 
computer actually is one. To what extent a Turing test should be relevant as 
evidence of personhood in a court of law is discussed  id. at 1280. 
 123. Id. at 1276. 
 124. Id. at 1276 n. 159 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 285–302 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)). 
 125. Solum, supra note 3, at 1278. 
532 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:2 
  
question is whether the fact that human beings are made natu-
rally while AIs are made artificially should make a difference. 
Solum believes the argument does not really add to the debate: 
whether an AI should be granted constitutional rights depends 
on it being a person and, if this is the case, an AI should not be 
owned by another person.126 Moreover, even if AIs come into 
the world as the property of their makers, like slaves, they can 
emancipate and become free persons.127 Or, as artificial slaves, 
“they might still be entitled to some measure of due process and 
dignity.”128 
4.  Conclusion 
Solum concludes that one could employ an intelligent, non-
human system as a trustee, attributing it a measure of legal 
personhood that fits the restricted capabilities of a system that 
is capable of autonomic decision-making even if it does not “un-
derstand” the meaning of its decisions and does not have a goal 
in life (and does not really have a “life” in our biologic sense of 
the word).129 We think that his arguments are valid for com-
puter agents like avatars, robots, and software programs that 
function in a sufficiently autonomic way. In the following sec-
tion, we will take a more detailed look into the legal intricacies 
of the validity of and liability for contracting by (means of) 
computer agents. Building on Solum’s discussion of constitu-
tional rights for AIs, we think that, as long as the behavior of 
computer agents is ultimately syntactical, based on correlations 
that have no meaning because the system has no consciousness 
of the world around it, we cannot grant posthuman rights and 
liberties that presume the capability to reflect upon one’s ac-
tions, initiate intentional action, and take responsibility. For 
the same reasons, it does not make sense to hold contemporary 
computer agents liable on the basis of culpable and wrongful 
action. We will return to this issue below, especially in the dis-
cussion of Teubner’s position.130 
                                                          
 126. Id. at 1279. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1282. 
 130. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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B.  CONTRACTING AND LIMITED PERSONHOOD 
1.  Allen and Widdison (1996) 
In 1996, Tom Allen and Robin Widdison investigated the 
issue of the legal implications of digital contracting by comput-
er systems that operate not just automatically but autonomous-
ly.131 They define autonomous machines as those that, first, can 
learn through experience, second, modify the instructions in 
their own programs, and third, devise new instructions.132 This 
sounds very much like what IBM has recently coined “autonom-
ic computing,” defined as self-management, self-configuration, 
self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection.133 Allen and 
Widdison anticipate that what we shall call autonomic agents 
could be used for computer-generated, business-to-business 
transactions on the internet, especially for discrete transactions 
that are not performed in the framework of predetermined 
trading relationships.134 They envisage that such “on the spot” 
trading would encourage just-in-time ordering and stock con-
trol. They argue for adequate legal protection of such transac-
tions, to ensure that the legal consequences can be affected, for 
instance when it is unclear who is behind such autonomically 
concluded contracts.135 One way to provide a legal infrastruc-
ture that generates reliable agreements could be to register au-
tonomic electronic agents that initiate, negotiate, and conclude 
contracts for a company, as agents for the company in a public 
register.136 This would enable contracting parties to locate the 
responsible (legal) person behind the agent. 
Allen and Widdison discuss four ways of dealing with au-
tonomic agents that initiate, negotiate and conclude contracts: 
first, modifying contract doctrine; second, seeing the computer 
as a tool of communication; third, in the traditional analysis, 
denying validity to transactions generated by autonomous 
computers; or fourth, conferring legal personality to comput-
ers.137 We note that their usage of the term “computers” seems 
                                                          
 131. Allen & Widdison, supra note 68. 
 132. Id. at 27. 
 133. See Jeffrey O. Kephart & David M. Chess, The Vision of Autonomic 
Computing, 36 COMPUTER 41, 42–43 (2003). 
 134. Allen & Widdison, supra note 68, at 28. 
 135. See id. at 29. 
 136. Id. at 42. 
 137. Id. at 43. 
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a bit awkward, as they are basically referring to interconnected 
systems rather than single computers. For this reason, we will 
discuss their suggestions as relating to autonomic computer 
agents, which will typically be interconnected systems. 
i.  Modifying Contract Doctrine 
As to the first option of modifying the contract doctrine, the 
authors find that relaxing the requirement of intentionality in 
contract-making could solve the problem of computer-generated 
contracts. They say, “[T]he court would hold that the human 
trader’s generalized and indirect intention to be bound by com-
puter-generated agreements is sufficient to render the agree-
ments legally binding.”138 This would fit well with the fact that 
the “real” intentions of a contracting party will always remain 
virtual: they will be read into the concrete interactions that 
lead others to trust the party’s intention.139 We should remem-
ber, however, that the human parties that are bound by the 
contract may not know the exact terms of the contract and of-
ten not even be aware of the contract being concluded. The en-
tire legal framework of offer and acceptance is conducted 
through machine-to-machine communication.140 
ii.  The Computer As a Tool of Communication 
The authors argue that the second option of treating com-
puters as a tool of communication creates a legal fiction when 
used for autonomic agents. The agents are regarded as if they 
are a mere instrument in the hands of the contracting parties, 
while, in fact, they interact autonomically. They remark that 
unexpected and unreasonable contractual obligations could 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 44. 
 139. Id. 
 140. This is the difference between what has been coined as “Ambient Law” 
in D7.9: A VISION OF AMBIENT LAW 1 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops 
eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/profiling/#c1989 and Mireille Hil-
debrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES 175 (Rog-
er Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008). Ambient Law would imply that a 
legal norm is articulated into a technology, which means that the legislator is 
aware of the affordances of the technology and also requires that if legal con-
sequences are attributed to the violation of a norm, this is made contestable in 
a court of law. Replacing a legal by a technological framework is something 
altogether different, and could easily enforce norms in a way that places them 
outside the reach of the legal and constitutional framework. 
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arise by which the parties would nevertheless be bound.141 If 
the agents could be regarded as legal agents, courts could use 
the legal doctrine of actual and ostensible agency to mitigate 
the legal obligations. 
Actual agency is defined as: “the agency that exists when 
an agent is in fact employed by a principal.”142 Ostensible or 
apparent agency is defined as: 
agency by estoppel: an agency that is not created as an actual agency 
by a principal and an agent but that is imposed by law when a prin-
cipal acts in such a way as to lead a third party to reasonably believe 
that another is the principal’s agent and the third party is injured by 
relying on and acting in accordance with that belief[.] A principal has 
a duty to correct a third party’s mistaken belief in an agent’s authori-
ty to act on the principal’s behalf. If the principal could have corrected 
the misunderstanding but failed to do so, he or she is estopped from 
denying the existence of the agency and is bound by the agent’s acts 
in dealing with the third party. 143 
We should note that for ostensible agency an action is re-
quired by the principal; she cannot be bound to a third party if 
there is no action of the principal that leads a third party to 
reasonably believe that the alleged agent is an actual agent. 
Should the principal, however, decide to pull the contract to-
wards herself by means of ratification, she will be bound by the 
contract. 
Another important part of the law of agency that is rele-
vant here is the doctrine of disclosed and undisclosed agency: 
Continental European laws restrict the application of agency rules to 
cases where the agent acts openly in another’s name. Thus, French 
jurists infer from article 1984 of their Civil Code, according to which 
agency is the act of the agent pour le mandant et en son nom (“for and 
on behalf of the principal”), the negative conclusion that in case an 
agent does not disclose that he is acting as an agent for a principal, 
the consequences touch only the “agent” himself. The hidden principal 
is not concerned by the effects of the transaction at all. Section 164 of 
the West [sic] German Civil Code expressly provides that “an agent, 
who acts without disclosing the fact that he is acting as agent, is the 
only one to acquire any rights and is exclusively personally liable.” 
In contrast to the continental view, when an agent contracts in his 
own name without disclosing his principal, the common law allows 
the undisclosed principal under certain conditions to sue or be sued 
by the third party. Such conditions include that the agent had power 
to make the contract and that the parties eventually learn their re-
                                                          
 141. Allen & Widdison, supra note 68, at 46. 
 142. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 18 (1996). 
 143. Id. 
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spective identities. This wider concept of agency has no counterpart in 
continental legal tradition. 
The use of this basic doctrine in the common-law countries gives rise 
to questions regarding the identity of the undisclosed principal, the 
election of remedies that must be made by the third party, the extent 
of the respective liabilities, the right of the third party to setoff (the 
amount of its own damages from any sum that might be awarded it), 
etc. A solution to these conflicts of interests must in final analysis rest 
upon an evaluation of the extent to which the relationship between 
the undisclosed principal and the agent should influence the contract 
made by the agent with a third party. 144 
The categories of disclosed and undisclosed agency seems 
highly relevant for our subject, and we should take into account 
what it affords in the case of attributing legal personhood to 
electronic agents or multi-agent-systems (MASs). 
iii.  Denying Validity to Transactions Generated by 
Autonomous Computers 
As to the third option of denying validity to transactions 
generated by autonomous computers, the authors point out 
that, as current doctrine demands human intention, the actions 
of autonomic digital agents could not lead to a valid contract. 
By not relaxing this requirement (as under the first option), 
human parties would not be obligated by the contracts con-
cluded by their autonomic agents. The authors indicate that the 
enforceability of an automatically generated contract would be-
come dependent upon whether the agent was an autonomic 
agent, while in fact this may not always be apparent to the oth-
er party. This, in their opinion, would stifle commercial enter-
prise. 
iv.  Granting Legal Personhood 
As to the fourth option of granting legal personhood, the 
authors investigate the moral entitlement, the social reality, 
and the legal expediency of legal personhood for autonomic 
agents. They agree with Solum145 that a moral entitlement to 
legal personhood would depend on them developing self-
consciousness. However, while they agree that at present no 
sign of such self-consciousness has emerged, they find that the 
legal system could still recognize the social fact of the indepen-
                                                          
 144. Agency (law), Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/8976/agency (last accessed May 2, 
2010). 
 145. See supra Part IV.A. 
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dent actions of autonomic digital agents. Referring to Teubner, 
they suggest that it makes sense to grant legal personhood to 
entities that are capable of what we call autonomic action. The 
point is not whether an agent understands the meaning of its 
actions (which would require consciousness and allow for auto-
nomous actions). The point is only that, since it is capable of 
developing a trading strategy of its own, it makes sense to 
make the agent responsible for such independent action. The 
legal expediency of granting legal personhood resides in allow-
ing the agent to act as a legal agent (which is not possible for 
an entity without legal personhood), and to allow a contracting 
party to identify the digital agent as the legal agent of a specific 
company. They propose for companies to register their digital 
autonomic agents in a public register, stating the competence 
and limitation of liability. 
2.  Wettig and Zehendner (2003–2004) 
Like Allen and Widdison, Wettig and Zehendner have dis-
cussed the legal implications of contracting by electronic 
agents.146 Their analysis is much in line with Allen and Widdi-
son’s, but because it is based on continental law and German 
legal doctrine. They note that, in contrast to conventional soft-
ware, electronic agents have characteristics like reactivity, 
proactivity, adaptive behavior, mobility, and autonomy (which 
they define as “the ability to operate without the direct inter-
vention of humans or others, and . . . some kind of control over 
their action and internal state.”).147 
Noting that declaration of intent (DOI) is a key factor in 
determining the legal status of a contract, Wettig and Zehend-
ner distinguish between three forms of ICT-related declarations 
of intent: electronic DOI, where the intent is communicated by 
electronic means; automated DOI, where the intent are me-
chanically produced with the help of a computer program; and 
computer declaration (Computererklärung), where the declara-
tion of intent is electronically produced in a completely auto-
matic way without being directly influenced by human action. 
                                                          
 146. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25; Steffen Wettig 
& Eberhard Zehendner, The Electronic Agent: A Legal Personality Under 
German Law?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAW AND ELECTRONIC AGENTS 
WORKSHOP 97–112 (A. Oskamp  & E. Weitzenböck eds. 2003) [hereinafter 
Wettig & Zehendner, The Electronic Agent]. 
 147. Wettig & Zehendner, The Electronic Agent, supra note 146. 
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The latter form can be seen as the declaration of what we call 
autonomic agents. These declarations are usually seen as a 
DOI of their user, comparing the agent to a vending machine 
(selling automatically to anyone who happens to use the ma-
chine) or a working tool (where the declaration functions as a 
signature in blank, without the user knowing the exact future 
contents of the contract).148 
The issue now is whether contracting activities by electron-
ic agents can still be treated as “computer declarations” under 
German law, especially as these agents become increasingly 
autonomic. The traditional approach of German law ascribes 
the intent of an electronic agent to a user. Particularly for mo-
bile agents, with increasing spatial distance between principal 
and agent, this approach becomes troublesome, as the principal 
seems to have less direct influence over the agent. In a more 
modern approach, authors have suggested various analogies to 
ascribe legal personhood to electronic agents to solve this dis-
tance problem.” In this approach, three legal doctrines are ap-
plied to interpret electronic agents as having some form of legal 
personhood under existing law. First, the agent could be a rep-
resentative (Stellvertreter) who declares his own intent with 
mandate of the principal; the problems here are that a repre-
sentative needs to be a legal subject himself, which is proble-
matic for electronic agents, and particularly that in case of false 
representation, the electronic agent is liable (legal doctrine 
supposing that the agent, not the alleged principal, is the con-
tracting party) but cannot pay up by itself. Second, the agent 
could be a messenger (Bote) conveying the DOI of its principal. 
The problem here is that (autonomic) electronic agents do more 
than just transport messages; they influence the terms of the 
contract and are therefore not mere messengers. Third, the 
electronic agent could function as a minor, with limited capaci-
ty to contract itself (beschränkt Geschäftsfähiger). Contrary to 
minors who contract on their own behalf (e.g., buying ice 
cream), however, electronic agents contract on their principal’s 
behalf, and the regulations for contracting by minors are there-
fore ill-suited.149 
                                                          
 148. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 120–22. 
 149. Id. at 123–26. At 127, the authors briefly reject an alternative “histor-
ic approach” of interpreting electronic agents as slaves under Roman law, 
where the slaves can contract without having legal capacity, and their actions 
being attributed to their master. Arguing that in current law, contractual ca-
pacity presumes legal capacity, Wettig and Zehendner thus dispose of the his-
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Since both the traditional and the modern approach  in-
conveniently accommodate contracting by electronic agents un-
der existing law, Wettig and Zehendner propose a “progressive 
approach’” of changing the law: granting legal personhood, un-
der certain conditions, to electronic agents. Besides the natural 
person and the legal person, the electronic person (e-Person) 
could be created. Following up on Allen and Widdison’s sugges-
tion, Wittig and Zehender propose that companies register 
their autonomic electronic agents in a public register, stating 
the competence and limitation of liability. They write, “The re-
sult would be a kind of agent with limited liability (Ltd. 
Agent).” For the party contracting with the agent, this ap-
proach has the advantage that they do not always have to trace 
back the mobile agent to its distant principal, but can check the 
agent’s solvency in the register. For the owner of the agent, the 
advantage is that they can limit the agent’s liability, and, thus, 
control the risk of using an autonomic agent over whose actions 
the owner has relatively little direct influence. Introducing this 
restricted form of legal personhood for electronic agents and a 
register with limited liability does not preclude users from ap-
plying unregistered agents, but for such agents that lack the 
restricted legal personhood, the actions would always be attri-
buted to the owner.150 Of course, changing the law in this way 
is only possible if an adequate definition can be given for elec-
tronic agents that are to have a claim to restricted legal per-
sonhood. Wettig and Zehendner point to the definitions of elec-
tronic agents in UETA, UCITA, and the Canadian UECA151 as 
a good starting point for coining an acceptable definition.152 
C.  ACCOUNTABILITY: TOWARDS FULL PERSONHOOD? 
Whereas the previous section discussed the ways in which 
Allen and Widdison and Wettig and Zehendner have followed 
                                                          
toric suggestion by Erich Schweighofer, Vorüberlegungen zu künstlichen Per-
sonen: autonome Roboter und intelligente Softwareagenten, in AUF DEM WEG 
ZUR EPERSON: AKTUELLE FRAGESTELLUNGEN DER RECHTSINFORMATIK 45–54 
(Erich Schweighofer ed. 2001). 
 150. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 127–29. 
 151. See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION ACT § 2(6) (Nat’l Conference 
of Comm’r on Unif. State Law 1999), UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION 
TRANSACTION ACT § 102(27), (Nat’l Conference of Comm’r on Unif. State Law 
1999), CANADIAN UNIFORM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT § 2, ¶ 19 (Unif. Law 
Conference of Canada 1999). 
 152. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 129–31. 
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up on the first line in Solum’s analysis—new types of entities 
acting as a trustee—we now turn to literature that builds upon 
Solum’s second line: to what extent can new types of entities be 
held accountable for moral wrongs and attributed rights and 
duties? 
1.  Karnow (1996) 
In 1996, Karnow investigated the issue of legal solutions 
for harm caused by distributed artificial intelligences.153 His 
major point is that, at this moment, we see emergent AIs that 
operate in the real world with decision programs, making “deci-
sions unforeseen by humans.”154 These unforeseen, and some-
times unforeseeable, decisions will at some point cause damage 
or injury, and Karnow claims that this will lead to “insuperable 
difficulties [which] are posed by the traditional tort system’s re-
liance on the essential element of causation.”155 He explains 
that the complexity of digital systems “connotes multiple inte-
racting but independent elements” making it “difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, to predict the sum state of the complex 
system.”156 As to search machines, Karnow anticipates that 
even “‘classic expert’ systems that mechanically apply a series 
of rules to well-defined fact patterns” (automatic agents, in our 
terms) will not be able to mine relevant information, due to 
persistent and exponential information growth.157 Instead, 
what he calls “intelligent agent technology” will be responsible 
for the searching of relevant databases and for deciding on re-
levant actions to be taken. His reference to intelligent agent 
technology confirms Allen and Widdison’s discussion of what 
we have called autonomic agents. Karnow claims that these 
agent systems are relatively unpredictable, stating that “‘fixing’ 
these unpredictable systems to operate predictably will evisce-
rate and render them useless.”158 This suggest that “[t]rue crea-
tivity and autonomy require that the program truly makes its 
own decisions, outside the bounds expressly contemplated by 
                                                          
 153. Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 
11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147 (1996). 
 154. Id. at 148. 
 155. Id. at 148–49. 
 156. Id. at 149. 
 157. Id. at 152. Cf. JANNIS KALLINIKOS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
INFORMATION: INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 48–
75 (2006) (discussing the effects of information growth). 
 158. Karnow, supra note 153, at 154. 
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either the human designers or users.”159 
The problem with such unpredictability is that it generates 
errors and faults, due to what Karnow calls “pathological deci-
sions.”160 Such decisions are not something we can resolve by 
writing better programs. On the contrary, Karnow claims that 
“[t]hese are not ‘bugs’ in the programs, but are part of their es-
sence.”161 He speaks of the fact that “the long-term operation of 
complex systems entails a fundamental uncertainty” precisely 
in the kind of complex and unpredictable environments that 
require the input of autonomic agents.162 As these agents are 
both mobile and distributed, they easily move outside the con-
trol of their user, and it becomes difficult to attribute causality 
to either the physical person or company that is behind the 
agent. But as these agents interact within a networked world, 
it becomes equally impossible to attribute causality to a single 
node within a network (as the node builds on connectivity) or to 
the network as a whole. One of the reasons for this is that such 
intelligent agents will often be polymorphous (difficult to iden-
tify as the same agent), while on top of that the boundaries of 
the network are dynamic, raising similar difficulties of identifi-
cation. 
Liability in law requires causality—without a causal rela-
tionship, one simply cannot attribute liability. Even in the case 
of strict liability, which forsakes traditional requirements like 
intent or fault, negligence, recklessness, or other types of cul-
pability, tort liability cannot do without proximate cause. The 
concept of proximate cause is a typically legal notion, used to 
discriminate between cause in fact (i.e., what continental law-
yers would call the conditio sine qua non) and the legally rele-
vant cause.163 The idea is that any event in real life has a mul-
                                                          
 159. Id. at 161. Cf. Giovanni Sartor, Agents in Cyberlaw, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE WORKSHOP ON THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC AGENTS (2002), available at  
http://www.lea-online.net/publications/Sartor.pdf. Sartor remarks: 
Note that the difficulty of anticipating the operations of the agent is 
not a remediable fault, but it is a necessary consequence of the very 
reason for using an agent: the need to approach complex environment 
by decentralizing knowledge acquisition, processing and use. If the 
user could forecast and predetermine the optimal behaviour in every 
circumstance, there would be no need to use an agent (or, at least, an 
intelligent agent). 
 160. Karnow, supra note 153, at 161. 
 161. Id. at 161. 
 162. Id. at 162. 
 163. Id. at 176–78. 
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tiplicity of causes that overlap and intermingle, from distant in 
time and space to relatively nearby or even concurrent causes. 
To establish liability, one needs to single out an event that al-
lows the imputation of responsibility for harm suffered, which 
already limits the domain of possibly relevant causes to human 
action (including omission or neglect), or at least to actions at-
tributable to a legal person. To single out the relevant causa-
tion amongst the mass of causally relevant events, lawyers 
speak of the proximate cause, which is often equated with a 
cause that “brought about” harm that was “reasonably foresee-
able.”164 The idea is that the (natural or legal) person that could 
have foreseen the harm should have prevented it. For the same 
reason, someone who caused an accident in the sense of “causa-
tion in fact” may be absolved in law from having caused the ac-
cident because of what is called an “intervening” or “supersed-
ing” cause that is deemed more relevant for the harm caused.165 
Imagine that a person breaks the bike of a friend, which makes 
him liable for the damage done to the property of his friend. 
Not having the bike, his friend walks to the supermarket and 
gets hit by a car. Though breaking the bike is a cause in fact of 
the accident, courts will probably consider the collision with the 
car to be an intervening cause. Karnow rightly explains that 
what is “reasonably foreseeable” depends on custom and com-
mon sense, meaning that in a fast changing environment like 
today’s, “reasonable foreseeability is a moving target.”166 This 
keeps the legal system alert and responsive to societal devel-
opments. 
Karnow then moves on to discuss causality in an environ-
ment with autonomic agents. His main point is that such an 
environment will come to a point where the attribution of legal 
causality (the establishment of proximate cause) does not make 
sense anymore.167 The reason for this is that autonomic agents, 
cooperating across a distributed network, will develop what he 
calls “pathological decisions” next to routine and highly origi-
nal, successful decisions. Such decisions are not always pre-
dictable, they are not a matter of preventable error or bugs in 
the system, but part and parcel of the intelligence of the net-
work. Karnow basically warns that we cannot have our cake 
                                                          
 164. Id. at 178. 
 165. Id. at 178–79. 
 166. Id. at 181. 
 167. Id. at 181–82. 
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and eat it too—autonomic agents will solve problems we could 
not have solved ourselves, but this will also involve an “unpre-
dictable pathology.”168 To attribute liability to any (human or 
non-human) node in the network, or even to the network itself, 
would create an arbitrary legal fiction that has no purpose in 
the law: since nobody could have foreseen this decision, nobody 
could have prevented it, so imputing causality or liability 
makes no sense. As Karnow explains, “The notion of ‘proximate’ 
or ‘legal’ causation implies a court’s ability to select out on a 
case-by-case basis the ‘responsible’ causes. But where damage 
is done by an ensemble of concurrently active polymorphic in-
telligent agents, there is insufficient persistence of individual 
identifiable agencies to allow this form of discrimination.”169 
One way of dealing with this situation would be to ban au-
tonomic agents altogether. One could imagine that the prin-
ciple of precaution is at play here, requiring more research into 
the potential consequences of harm caused by entities that 
cannot be held responsible before introducing a technology with 
irreversible consequences. Another option, chosen by Karnow, 
is to abolish legal liability in such a case and to seek a technol-
ogical solution for what he deems to be a technological problem. 
Instead of hanging on to the traditional tort system and trying 
to control the uncontrollable, Karnow proposes a Turing Regi-
stry.170 This Registry would enlist certified autonomic agents 
that are insured against the risk of pathological decisions, 
meaning that even when no proximate cause can be established 
(thus excluding strict liability) the relevant agent is at least in-
sured in order to compensate for damages.171 How this solves 
the difficulties of identification of a polymorphous agent con-
sisting of a network with unstable boundaries is not altogether 
clear. 
2.  Teubner (2007) 
Gunther Teubner makes the provocative argument that 
“there is no compelling reason to restrict the attribution of ac-
tion exclusively to humans and to social systems.”172 Teubner 
                                                          
 168. Id. at 188. 
 169. Id. at 191. 
 170. Id. at 193. 
 171. Id. at 193–96. 
 172. For example, legal persons such as companies and states. Gunther 
Teubner, Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Ac-
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states that personifying other non-humans is a social reality 
today and a political necessity for the future.173 
Writing from a systems theory perspective, Teubner sees 
attribution of personhood as a mechanism for social systems to 
reduce uncertainty: viewing a complex entity as a person 
enables you to communicate with it and to mutually establish 
expectations. In fact, “through personification, the social sys-
tem ‘parasitises’ the intrinsic dynamics of autonomous 
processes in its environment.”174 Rather than focusing on onto-
logical properties (like mind, soul, reflexive capacities, empa-
thy) as a condition for personhood, an entity is considered an 
“actor” and attributed personhood by its environment under the 
minimum requirement of “double contingency.”175 This means 
that in both directions of social interaction there is an element 
of unpredictability. We can treat non-humans as persons if 
there is “a resistance, a ‘recalcitrance’ which they [the non-
humans] exert and which cannot be overcome by existing scien-
tific knowledge.”176 This seems to be the case with autonomic, 
adaptable software agents whose actions cannot be predicted in 
advance with sufficient precision by their owner or contracting 
party. Contrary to Latour who, in Teubner’s account, seems to 
argue that all kinds of natural objects that “modify a state of 
affairs by making a difference” can be treated as “actants” in 
this way,177 Teubner himself requires a “capacity for dealing 
with proto-meaning”178 as a precondition for personhood, and 
therefore considers adaptable software agents and domesti-
cated animals as candidates for “actants” with personhood.179 
Besides actants, Teubner also embraces Latour’s notion of 
“hybrids, such as associations of human actors and non-human 
                                                          
tors in Politics and Law, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 497, 502 (2006). 
 173. Id. at 502–05. 
 174. Id. at 504. 
 175. Id. at 503–04. 
 176. Id. at 510. 
 177. For Latour’s position, see supra III.A. 
 178. Teubner, supra note 172, at 511. Teubner does not explain what he 
means by “dealing with proto-meaning.” It probably indicates a certain capaci-
ty, in a functional sense, to “understand” communication with the environ-
ment, like a dog “understands” a command to lie down without actually know-
ing human language, or like an adaptable software agent “understands” that 
its owner is interested in English Victorian novels after consecutive commands 
to search for Austen, Eliot and Trollope. 
 179. Id. 
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actants.180 Because some actants, like animals, lack certain 
communicative skills, they can team up with human actors, for 
example, animal-rights groups, to function as full-blown actors 
in the social arena. These hybrids can now be personified as ac-
tors in their own right, under certain conditions. Although 
Teubner does not give the example, we can imagine electronic 
agents being employed by a company with limited liability as 
such a hybrid. Rather than merely fitting the traditional model 
of a legal person (the company with limited liability), it is the 
hybrid of agents and company that should be the focus of our 
attention, because this empowers electronic agents to maximize 
their potential in the economic and social life. 
The result of all this is that indeed non-humans gain access to social 
communication, albeit in a rather indirect way. The law plays a spe-
cial role in this game; it stabilizes non-human personality by granting 
legal status to the hybrids via the construct of the juridical person, by 
attributing to them the capacity to act, by giving them rights, burden-
ing them with duties and making them liable in several forms of legal 
responsibility.181 
The attribution of legal status does not necessarily entail 
“full-fledged legal subjectivity in order to open new political dy-
namics.”182 Different gradations of legal personhood and legal 
capacity for action are possible, depending on the entity and 
the social context. In the case of animal rights, basically defen-
sive institutions will be created for legal protection (to preserve 
ecology). In the case of electronic agents, however, legal perso-
nification, especially in economic and technological context, 
“creates aggressive new action centers as basic productive in-
stitutions.”183 In other words, attributing legal personhood, un-
der certain conditions, to electronic agents capable of dealing 
with proto-meaning (adaptable, autonomic software agents), or 
to hybrids of such agents and natural or legal persons, enables 
them to act in an economic and technologically significant way. 
3.  Matthias (2007) 
Another “plea for legal change,” as his subtitle emphasizes, 
is given by Andreas Matthias,184 who has explored conditions 
                                                          
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 515. 
 182. Id. at 20. 
 183. Id. at 521. 
 184. Matthias, supra note 4. 
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for legal, moral, and social personhood and applied these to 
self-learning and self-adapting technology. He identifies an “ac-
countability gap” (Verantwortungslücke): 
[T]here exists a growing class of accidents caused by machines, where 
the traditional ways of attributing responsibility are no longer com-
patible with our feeling of justice and the moral preconditions of so-
ciety, since no-one has sufficient control over the actions of the ma-
chine, to be able to take responsibility.185 
Autonomic agents—not only software agents, but also for 
example unmanned aerial vehicles or digital pets—present 
such an accountability gap, first, because they are unpredicta-
ble (unberechenbar) and, second, because they act outside the 
“visibility horizon” of their maker, so that in case of failure, no 
manual intervention is possible.186 
Matthias articulates five cumulative conditions for the 
ability to carry legal responsibility: intentionality, receptivity 
and responsiveness to causes, having second-order desires, le-
gal sanity, and ability to distinguish between intended and 
merely foreseeable consequences of actions.187 If these condi-
tions are fulfilled, someone can carry legal responsibility, in the 
triple sense of having the capacity to perform legal acts 
(Geschäftsfähigkeit), to be held guilty of crimes (Schuldfähig-
keit) and to be held accountable for unlawful acts (Deliktfähig-
keit).188 
Interpreting the five conditions for legal responsibility in a 
functional way, he argues that legal accountability could accrue 
to certain classes of machines (software and/or hardware), per-
haps not current ones, but those in the foreseeable future that 
are even more self-learning and autonomic than today’s ma-
chines. Indeed, it is “only a matter of time before the distance 
between the producer/operator and the acting machine will be 
so large, that the absurdity will become obvious” of “transfer-
ring the accountability to the producer or operator (who is ever 
less involved in the machine’s acts).”189 This confirms Allen and 
Widdison’s point that not attributing legal personhood to these 
machines is more of a legal fiction than providing for it would 
be.190 
                                                          
 185. Id. at 22. 
 186. Id. at 37. 
 187. Id. at  46 et seq. 
 188. Id. at 63–72. 
 189. Id. at 113–14. 
 190. Allen &  Widdison, supra note 68. 
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Matthias observes that “persons” and “human beings” 
should not be equated off-hand, since history and culture teach 
us that many humans were (and sometimes are) not considered 
by society or law as persons, and vice versa. Thus, Matthias’s 
analysis warns us not to interpret criteria for personhood in an 
anthropomorphic way, but functionally in terms of whether the 
goals of legal accountability can be met. Machines can “learn” 
and “be educated” (e.g., through neural networks that can in-
corporate legal decisions into their rule system), and they can 
earn and administer money (since they perform economic tasks 
and can learn to manage bank accounts) out of which damages 
can be compensated. If autonomic machines are equipped with 
such tools that enable them to learn, administer money, and 
conclude insurance contracts, applying coercive powers (like 
education or compensating damages) to machines is not at all 
absurd, but often a natural extension of the original application 
area of these powers that can fulfill the same goals as the legis-
lature originally intended.191 
Matthias even goes as far as to argue that the criminal 
goals of special and general prevention as well as retribution 
could be reached by “punishing” the machine. His analysis 
here, however, is rather brief and less convincing than else-
where.192 Altogether, the “plea for legal change” to hold ma-
chines legally accountable in order to stop the accountability 
gap is more convincing where it concerns the capacity to per-
form contracts and to be held accountable, to a certain extent, 
for tort. “Geschäftsfähige” and “deliktfähige” autonomic ma-
chines can in that sense be attributed legal personhood. 
                                                          
 191. Matthias, supra note 4, at 239 et seq. 
 192. Id. at 247–49. For special and general prevention, he does not explain 
how this would work with machines. As for retribution, Matthias argues that, 
even if the machine does not observe retributive punishment as such, “the only 
aspect important for the effectiveness of a retributive act is whether it makes 
the original victim experience an adequate feeling of satisfaction,” and this 
could in principle also be effected by “punishing” a machine. In our view, not 
only is this difficult to operationalize in practice, but focusing on the concrete 
victim’s feelings also does not fit in criminal legal theory of retribution. Id. at 
249. 
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V.  CLARIFYING PERSONHOOD AND AGENCY AT 
DIFFERENT LEVELS 
A.  DIFFERENT TYPES OF PERSONHOOD 
It is helpful at this point to distinguish between various 
types of personhood. Matthias makes a useful distinction be-
tween legal, moral, and social persons, with an increasing sense 
of “personality.” That is, the widest class of persons is the legal 
person, i.e., a bearer of legal responsibility, like natural persons 
and juridical persons. They can contract and compensate for 
damages and can also be the object of coercive or punitive 
measures, in a utilitarian or functionalist sense. They do not 
necessarily need to have a moral dimension. A narrower class 
is the moral person, i.e., those legal persons that are responsive 
to moral reasoning, like most human beings. They can be 
praised or detested, rewarded or punished, and they are open to 
moral guilt. The narrowest class of persons, in Matthias’s view, 
is the social person, also called the natural or “full” person, i.e., 
the moral person who is socially accepted as a person. Most 
human beings are social persons, but not always. It is cultural-
ly dependent just which human beings are fully accepted in so-
ciety as “full” persons.193 
We can extend Matthias’s categorization with the model of 
virtual entities and abstract persons that has been developed in 
the FIDIS project.194 An entity is “anything that has a distinct 
existence; it is the fundamental ‘thing’ that can be identified.” 
This includes physical entities (with some sort of physical con-
stituency) and virtual entities, i.e., “an entity which is or has 
been the product of the mind or imagination.”195 An abstract 
person is “a virtual entity that can have rights, duties, obliga-
tions and/or responsibilities associated to it in a certain con-
text.”196 These rights or duties are not necessarily legal rights 
or duties. They can also be, for example, moral or technical in 
nature. If they are legal, however, then the abstract person is 
also a legal person in Matthias’s sense. The legal person can, 
therefore, be seen as a subcategory of the category of abstract 
                                                          
 193. Id. at 43–44. 
 194. Jaquet-Chiffelle, supra note 7. FIDIS stands for the Future of Identity 
in the Information Society, an EU Funded research project. See www.fidis.net 
(last visited May 11, 2010). 
 195. Id. at 33. 
 196. Id. at 35. 
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persons, which again is a subcategory of the category of virtual 
entities. This is illustrated in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Categories of Persons 
 
One way of depicting the central issue of this article is illu-
strated with this figure: certain abstract entities, like pseudo-
nyms, avatars, and software agents, operate sufficiently auto-
nomically that they can be considered what some authors call 
abstract persons. The question we have explored would then be 
abstract or virtual entities 
abstract or virtual persons 
legal persons 
moral persons 
social 
persons 
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whether they could “step up” one category and enter the more 
inner circle of legal persons, or perhaps even, in the long term, 
reach the category of moral or social persons. 
Criteria for establishing legal personhood are not set in 
stone, and there is no obvious consensus distinguishable in le-
gal literature what precisely is constitutive for legal person-
hood.197 Some basics are clear, however, namely that person-
hood is associated with the legal capacity to act, and that this 
capacity involves civil actions (such as contracting) and crimi-
nal actions (committing a crime). For personhood to be mea-
ningful, that means that an entity should be capable of per-
forming such actions and bearing the consequences of them, 
which is particularly relevant when something goes wrong. It is 
here that legal personhood can be split in two: 
 legal persons who are capable of civil actions, such as 
contracting, and who can bear consequences of civil 
wrong-doing: compensate for damages in case of breach 
of contract and tort; this may also include other unlaw-
ful but not morally wrong behavior, like misdemea-
nors198 and administrative offences; 
 legal persons who are capable of all types of legal ac-
tions, and who can bear both civil and criminal respon-
sibilities; this is the category of legal persons who are 
also moral persons. 
Thus, we can distinguish between a limited and a full 
sense of legal personhood. What is considered constitutive for 
these types of personhood may depend on one’s perspective on 
the law, for example, whether one approaches the law from sys-
tems theory, functionalism, naturalism, or legal positivism. 
B.  DIFFERENT TYPES OF AGENCY 
For the sake of clarification, we have introduced above con-
ceptual distinctions, from a theoretical point of view, between 
                                                          
 197. Cf. Matthias, supra note 4, at 46 (noting that many authors, while giv-
ing substantially varying criteria, each believe they have articulated the one 
and only sufficient condition for legal personhood (often based on an anthro-
pomorphic paradigm of personhood)). 
 198. Criminal offenses consist of crimes and misdemeanours. Crimes are 
offenses that harm some fundamental value and thus can be considered as 
morally wrong; misdemeanours are offenses that breach a rule that is not 
primarily based on fundamental values but rather on creating order in society, 
such as the rule that cars drive on the right or left side of the road, or that cit-
izens must pay taxes. 
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different levels of automation and autonomy: automatic, auto-
nomic and autonomous entities.199 From a practical point of 
view, these distinctions might become blurred and more diffi-
cult to assess in some specific situations. Indeed, we might ob-
serve some overlapping between these three types of automa-
tion and autonomy: for example, a software agent that is not 
able to modify its own program in order to achieve a certain 
goal is typically an automatic agent, but if its behavior appears 
to be unpredictable anyway, which can easily occur with com-
plex automatic agents, it can function in much the same way as 
an autonomic agent. Probabilistic algorithms using an external 
source of entropy can lead to fixed algorithms with unpredicta-
ble behavior: the program’s actions are not always predictable. 
This creates almost a continuum between automatic and auto-
nomic entities. The decision to qualify a particular entity as au-
tomatic or autonomic might eventually depend on an arbitrary 
threshold. 
The same is likely to happen with robots and cyborgs and 
other enhanced humans. The limit between human beings and 
machines might become fuzzy, creating a continuum too be-
tween autonomic and autonomous entities. When does a cyborg 
stop being part of mankind, and would it lose its autonomous 
property, when we replace, little by little, original parts of a 
human being by artificial components? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 199. See supra Part III.B. 
552 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:2 
  
 
 
Figure 2. The continuum between automatic, auto-
nomic and autonomous entities 
 
Imagine the extreme case of a cyborg consisting of a living 
(enhanced) brain embodied in a robotical, artificial “body”. 
What if moreover the control of this cyborg’s actions is distri-
buted between its human (enhanced) brain and either internal 
concurrent software agents or external computer programs? 
Would this affect the measure of freedom assumed in the attri-
bution of culpable and wrongful action? 
Above, in relation to the “natural person objection”200 we 
have already indicated that the clear distinction between bio-
logical and non-biological entities may become blurred with the 
advent of cyborgs and synthetic biology. Even computers might 
move from pure electronic components to biological or hybrid 
ones. Research in biological computing is already a reality.201 If 
we replace, step by step, artificial components of a computer or 
a robot by human parts, when does it become a person that 
could qualify as a human being? 
The blurring of this distinction, however, does not imply 
that it becomes irrelevant. It rather shows that distinctions are 
analytical and usually do not map easily onto the flux of a fast 
changing reality. The famous question of when a collection of 
grains of sand counts as a heap comes to mind. In law, we know 
that distinctions should not be made arbitrarily, since they will 
generate legal consequences. The point is to acknowledge that 
the difference between autonomic and autonomous action is 
neither simply given in reality nor an arbitrary social construc-
tion. This decision implies legal consequences that have ethical 
implications that need serious consideration if we wish to sus-
tain fundamental (post)human rights that imply a measure of 
reflection and the capacity for intentional action. 
The distinction between automatic and autonomic behavior 
on the one hand and autonomous action on the other hand, is 
particularly relevant for the question when a computer agent 
can be held liable for culpable and wrongful actions or can in-
itiate an appeal to (post)human rights. As indicated above, the 
                                                          
 200. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 201. See, e.g. BBC News, Biological Computer Born, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/358822.stm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
automatic autonomic autonomous 
threshold ? threshold ? 
software-agents 
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distinction is less, or maybe not at all, relevant for the question 
whether a restricted form of legal personhood can be created 
that allows the computer agent to act as a legal agent. We will 
not try to provide an answer to these questions, building on in-
sights from the literature review and the different types of per-
sonhood and agency that we have distinguished here. 
VI.  MEETING THE CHALLENGE: COMPUTER AGENTS AS 
LEGAL PERSONS? 
As we noted above,202 what is considered constitutive for 
legal personhood depends on one’s perspective on the law, for 
example, whether one looks at it from systems theory, functio-
nalism, natural law, legal positivism, or from a relational con-
ception of law.203 Regardless of one’s approach to the law, how-
ever, it is clear that emerging entities that operate at 
increasing distance from their principal pose a challenge to the 
law. This concerns first a challenge to determine the law, for in-
stance, if an electronic agent, because of a software bug, buys a 
camera outside his supposed pre-programmed money range, is 
the contract null and void because of lack of intention to buy, or 
is it valid and should the principal pay, and can he then ad-
dress the producer, programmer, or seller to compensate for his 
damages? Second, there is a challenge to enforce the law, be-
cause the distance between entity and principal, not only in the 
physical sense, but also in the metaphoric sense that the enti-
ty’s action is not determined in detail by the principal’s action, 
may make it hard to find the principal. Linking abstract per-
sons’ actions in the information society to their principals may 
require considerable effort, perhaps at a higher cost than the 
damage at issue. The third challenge concerns the point at 
which an autonomic agent develops a measure of autonomy 
that implies the capacity of intentional action, based on a 
measure of self-consciousness, even if this is hard to imagine 
today. Such autonomy would raise the question of whether such 
autonomous agents should have full standing in law, meaning 
                                                          
 202. See supra Part V.A. 
 203. A relational theory of law emphasizes the instrumental as well as the 
constitutive aspects of law as two sides of the same coin. This is a normative 
position: the attribution of legal competence should always be instrumental as 
well as protective. This position means that legal personhood should be attri-
buted in a manner that protects the relevant human or non-human entities. 
See supra note 48. 
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that they can be called to account for criminal actions, while 
they are entitled to what we now call human rights. Facing this 
threefold challenge, the legal system has three potential 
courses of action, which can be seen as consecutive in time, al-
though the different stages may, of course, overlap at certain 
points. 
A.  SHORT TERM: INTERPRETATION AND EXTENSION OF EXISTING 
LAW 
First, the actions of computer agents can be dealt with by 
interpreting and extending existing law, incorporating the new 
technical developments in the existing legal system. This is dai-
ly practice, and the law has an impressive tradition in con-
struing ways to apply seemingly inapposite provisions to new 
situations. To achieve the validity of contracts concluded by au-
tonomic computers, the courts can qualify the general intention 
of the owner/user of the computer agent as sufficient for the in-
tention that is required for individual contracts, creating the 
possibility for those who contracted with the computer agent to 
sue the “principal” (note that since computer agents do not 
have legal personality at this point in time, the legal relation of 
principal and agent does not apply). This, however, will only 
work if the electronic agent is considered a tool in the hands of 
the owner/user, which is a legal fiction in as far as autonomic 
computers may decide to conclude contracts in ways the “prin-
cipal” cannot foresee with sufficient probability and which he 
has relatively little power to control by giving precise orders. 
Whereas viewing the autonomic agent as a tool could solve the 
problem of the contracting party, it may thus create substantial 
risks for the owner/user of this tool; and these risks could well 
hamper widespread adoption of overall useful autonomic com-
puter agents. Additionally, we must acknowledge that the con-
tracting party’s problem will only be solved if, after tracing the 
“principal” in the real world on the basis of the agent’s data 
(which hopefully include correct identifying data of the princip-
al), it pays to file suit against this “principal,” who may in fact 
reside in another jurisdiction. 
With today’s computer agents, considering a computer 
agent as a tool nevertheless seems to work well enough for the 
time being. For those authors who claim that referring to con-
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temporary computer agents as tools is a legal fiction,204 other 
time-honored legal constructions within existing law may be 
preferable to address the risks and accountability problems. 
For example, rules can be, and in some jurisdictions have been, 
drafted for electronic agents,205 stipulating under which condi-
tions contracts are valid and who is liable for which actions of 
agents. Also, someone intending to use a computer agent and 
desiring to limit the risk of the agent acting unpredictably can 
establish a corporation to serve as the principal for the elec-
tronic agent. 
For tomorrow’s agents, however, applying and extending 
existing doctrines in these ways may stretch legal interpreta-
tion to the point of breaking, when Matthias’s “accountability 
gap”206 really emerges in practice. 
B.  MIDDLE TERM: LIMITED PERSONHOOD WITH STRICT LIABILITY 
Creative interpretation and novel sector-specific rules pro-
vide for legal certainty, and they can also deviate from “off-line” 
legal constructs, for example, limiting liability in order to sti-
mulate the market for promising new technologies. However, at 
some point it may make more sense to introduce strict liability 
for electronic agents if their unpredictable actions are felt to be 
too risky for business or consumers. 
In line with this strategy, interesting solutions have been 
suggested in the literature, notably to introduce a public regis-
ter for agents, which could allow contractants to find the identi-
ty of an agent’s principal, or, alternatively, to lay a claim on in-
surance for damages in case a registered agent goes haywire. 
The latter is similar to the establishment of victim funds, which 
is a way for society to control risks involving not too high losses 
for potentially many people, that are hard to attribute to indi-
vidual causal actors. 
A register of electronic agents might also be introduced to-
gether with a limited type of personhood for the electronic 
agents at issue. That is, the electronic agent itself will be re-
sponsible for its contracts and potential mishaps (outside of the 
moral or criminal sphere), based on strict liability. The agent 
could have money itself, for example by earning a small provi-
                                                          
 204. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 205. Cf. supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra Part V.A. 
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sion for each transaction it makes for his principal, and use this 
money (probably together with an insurance) to pay civil dam-
ages or administrative fines. It is currently not necessary to do 
this, but being aware of on-going technological developments 
that create more and more truly autonomic entities, we may 
have to consider this option in the middle term. Of course, this 
is not a trivial exercise. Some kind of procedure will have to be 
developed for deciding which claims can be accepted, and which 
court has jurisdiction if the agent or the claimant does not 
agree. We also note Karnow’s warning that polymorphous mo-
bile electronic agents may be hard to identify. In that case lia-
bility of the agent itself does not solve the problem and may ac-
tually create a problem in the case that the principal is not 
liable because there is no way to locate the principal, or if the 
principal can claim that he never gave reason to believe that 
the transaction was concluded in its name. 
Electronic agents are the most autonomic entities to date 
and thus the most likely candidate for “stepping up” a category 
to become a legal person, under certain conditions. However, 
we should bear in mind that legal personhood has different 
functions: it allows an entity to function smoothly in social and 
economic interactions, and it provides it with legal protection. 
Different contexts may lead to different forms and scopes of le-
gal personhood. Pseudonyms functioning as an entity in them-
selves, for example, will likely not become as autonomic as elec-
tronic agents, but they may acquire a “personality” of their own 
(like Mark Twain, for example, is a better-known personality 
than his principal, Sam Clemens). The reputation gained by a 
pseudonym may make it economically attractive to allow trade 
of pseudonyms, or protection against defamation and slander in 
order to protect their commercial value. Although this can like-
ly be effected very well with current laws and legal construc-
tions, it could be worth exploring whether pseudonyms, if they 
indeed acquire an important societal function of their own, 
could not be given limited legal personhood, rather like a ship 
has been attributed legal personhood to solve the very complex 
interactions that ships have in global sea trade. 
Also, perhaps a case could be made for comparing avatars 
to animals, and if the call for animal rights, often along with a 
plea for legal personhood for animals, continues to increase,207 
                                                          
 207. Cf. Teubner, supra note 172, with literature references. 
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why could not avatars trigger a movement for avatar rights?208 
After all, people sometimes become very attached to their ava-
tars,209 and Tamagotchi and Paro210 are examples of technolo-
gical pets that appeal to people’s emotions for their continued 
existence. Perhaps avatars and pet robots will become as cud-
dly as panda bears, and the social need to protect them from 
harm will lead legal scholars to argue for another type of li-
mited legal personhood, in that they can defend themselves in 
court; at first represented by human beings, like companies 
are. But there seems no reason why, in principle, an avatar 
could not be represented by a lawyer-avatar. Echoing Teubner’s 
provocative conclusion of his analysis of the ecological move-
ment (“Trees do have standing”),211 some scholar might, in 
twenty year’s time, eloquently argue that, in the contemporary 
technological world, avatars or technological pets are so vital 
for social life that they need rights to legally protect them from 
harm, like ecological systems today, and hence “avatar-human 
hybrids do have standing.” The problem, however, remains that 
since trees and animals are not capable of explaining their be-
havior in a court of law, granting them legal personhood seems 
to be a categorical mistake. Whereas granting restricted per-
sonhood could in fact make sense as a means of piecemeal en-
gineering, this is not Teubner’s ideal outcome. Though we ap-
preciate the provocative nature of his preference for sweeping 
statements, we think good reasons can be given against provid-
ing limited personhood for technological pets and criminal lia-
bility of animals.212 
C.  LONG TERM: FULL PERSONHOOD WITH “POSTHUMAN” RIGHTS 
The constructions of limited legal personhood could evolve 
                                                          
 208. Cf. PETS, People for the Ethical Treatment of Software, 
http://www.elsop.com/wrc/humor/pets.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (parody-
ing the animal-rights activist group PETA, People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals). 
 209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra Part II.D. 
 211. Teubner, supra note 172, at 16; cf. Matthias, supra note 4, at 141–234. 
 212. Note that times have existed when animals were considered eminent-
ly capable of criminal liability. Teubner, supra note 172, at 497–98. Teubner 
starts his article with a lively report of the rats of Autun, who were tried be-
fore an ecclesiastical court for eating and wantonly destroying barley crops in 
the diocese. This took place in 1522. In modern legal systems, such trials seem 
rather less fitting. 
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into the third strategy, namely to change the law more funda-
mentally by attributing full personhood to new types of entities. 
This would concern both liability on the basis of wrongful ac-
tion and culpability and a lawful claim to posthuman rights. 
Can we imagine that computer agents should be attributed 
moral personhood in the long term, if they gain the ability to 
make moral (or moral-looking) decisions, based on self-
consciousness (or something that looks to their environment 
like self-consciousness)? It seems important to distinguish be-
tween the issue of what standard is used to determine who or 
what qualifies for such full-fledged personhood and the issue of 
how we intend to establish whether a specific entity actually 
meets this criterion. We have argued that the relevant criterion 
is the emergence of self-consciousness, since this allows us to 
address an entity as a responsible agent, forcing it to reflect on 
its actions as its own actions, which constitutes the precondi-
tion of intentional action. We note that intentional action, in 
this view, is an emergent property of an agent who is respond-
ing to the act of being called to account.213 Evidently, autonomic 
agents also respond to their environment, but they do not re-
spond by developing a reflection on their own action (in the 
German phrase: ‘Reflektion auf eigenes Tun’), even if they may 
adapt their behavior to cope with changes in their environment. 
Some authors may object that this conclusion depends on the 
second issue, because the question is how we can establish that 
autonomic agents do not reflect on their behavior. Some cogni-
tive scientists could even doubt whether what we call self-
reflective, intentional, and autonomous action is not after all 
merely an epiphenomenon and an illusion of the brain.214 Al-
though this in itself entails an interesting discussion, it seems 
that, for law, the notion of an agent being capable of self-
reflection and intentional action is crucial and does make a dif-
ference. For “posthuman rights” to make sense, we have to as-
sume that autonomous action exists, even if it exists only as a 
productive illusion. 
We agree, then, with Solum that it makes no sense to ex-
clude outright non-human entities from such rights and re-
sponsibilities. His point that such attribution should depend on 
                                                          
 213. Cf. JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF (2005); Mireille 
Hildebrandt, Trial and “Fair Trial”: From Peer to Subject to Citizen, in THE 
TRIAL ON TRIAL 2:15–37 (Anthony Duffet et al. eds., 2006). 
 214. See supra note 51. This point also relates to the Turing test. 
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the empirical finding that novel types of entities develop some 
kind of self-consciousness and become capable of intentional ac-
tion seems reasonable, as long as we keep in mind that the 
emergence of such entities will probably require us to rethink 
notions of consciousness, self-consciousness and moral agency. 
Should a form of conscious self-reflection surface, then this will 
not necessarily be a property of a human-like robot (android), 
but rather erupt from distributed multi-agents systems that 
function as Karnow’s polymorphous mobile agents. The intelli-
gence and creativity of non-human entities presently depends 
on their interconnectedness, which allows for a measure of con-
text awareness. In fact, cognitive science provides reasons to 
believe that human identity itself emerges from distributed 
brain processes, challenging the rationalist humanistic under-
standing of human agency. So, while non-human entities may 
at some point in future have a claim to “posthuman” rights, our 
self-understanding may also evolve to seeing ourselves likewise 
as posthumans,215 because we can no longer think of humans in 
the classic understanding of “us” as a rational, unified identity 
that is transparent to itself. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
To decide whether a specific entity qualifies as a person 
and the ensuing question of whether such artificial persons 
should qualify as legal abstract persons, we could take a rela-
tive approach. This means that next to establishing the precon-
ditions for personhood we should acknowledge different levels 
of personhood, requiring different legal consequences. Thus, a 
particular smart application could qualify for a restricted form 
of legal personhood in as far as it can insure itself against lia-
bility; however, this should not imply the attribution of rights 
that make no sense for an entity that has no consciousness, no 
intentionality, no feelings, no independent goals and no capaci-
                                                          
 215. HAYLES, supra note 63. Note that the loss of this rationalist subject 
does not, however, entail that we can no longer hold each other responsible, 
since responsibility does not hinge upon sovereignty of the self. See BUTLER 
supra note 213. On the relation between autonomic computing and human 
agency, see M. HILDEBRANDT,  Autonomic and Autonomous “Thinking” as Pre-
conditions for Criminal Liability, in AUTONOMIC COMPUTING AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF HUMAN AGENCY: PHILOSOPHERS OF LAW MEETING 
PHILOSOPHERS OF TECHNOLOGY (M. Hildebrandt & A. Rouvroy eds.)  
ROUTLEDGE (forthcoming); Cf. supra note 97 (describing the cyborg vision of 
self). 
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ty for autonomous action. Criminal liability, which presumes a 
subject to be capable of autonomous action, had rather be attri-
buted to another legal subject that does have this capability. 
Thus, while a non-human legal subject would be liable for harm 
caused in terms of private law, another legal subject would be 
liable for the same harm in terms of criminal law. This other 
legal subject could be a human being, a corporation or public 
body with legal personality. 
What should interest us here is whether the attribution of 
a restricted legal personhood, involving certain civil rights and 
duties, has added value in comparison with other legal solu-
tions. For several scholars, it makes sense to ponder future 
strategies to deal with new entities by attributing limited forms 
of personhood,216 while others seem content with short-term in-
terpretative solutions.217 A few scholars even go further and ar-
gue that non-human entities, eventually, can lay a claim to full 
legal personhood.218 Others, however, try to circumvent having 
to solve the legal problem of accountability by devising technic-
al solutions that allow damages to be paid regardless of any de-
termination of causation.219 Choosing between these positions 
will depend largely on one’s outlook on law and technology, on 
what constitutes a true “person,” and whether and to what ex-
tent the world is changing through the emergence of new types 
of entities. 
For the time being, our research questions can be answered 
by the observation that interpretation and extension of the law 
seem to work well enough with today’s computer agents. If 
technology evolves and entities like pseudonyms, avatars, and 
particularly electronic agents become more autonomic and ac-
quire a “personality” of their own, however, it might be useful 
to treat them as new entities with their own identities in them-
selves, with certain legal rights, duties, obligations, and/or re-
sponsibilities.220 The majority view in the literature is that 
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sooner or later, limited legal personhood with strict liability is a 
good solution for solving the accountability gap, particularly in 
contracting, and for electronic agents, this may be sooner ra-
ther than later. When it comes to attributing limited legal per-
sonhood involving rights to ensure legal protection, for example 
to protect pseudonyms or avatars, the literature is considerably 
more cautious; however, most literature to date tends to focus 
on electronic agents rather than on newer types of entities like 
pseudonyms, avatars, or pet robots, and perhaps the line of re-
search on legal-protection rights for new types of entities has to 
be more fully developed in the literature. 
When it comes to attributing full legal personhood and 
“posthuman” rights to new types of entities, the literature 
seems to agree that this only makes sense if these entities de-
velop self-consciousness. For the science-fiction-minded, it is in-
teresting to speculate on a future where the independence of 
new entities, like androids or distributed multi-agent networks, 
reaches such a level that they move beyond autonomic-ness to a 
measure of autonomy, so that we may even consider giving 
them full legal personhood. But actually, this is a presump-
tuous statement. If networked machines begin to embody self-
consciousness, considering their potential advantages over our 
own computing and acting capacities, it may well be their deci-
sion whether or not to grant us legal personhood. Let us hope 
they will not treat us like we currently treat animals, as feed in 
our bio-industry.221 
 
                                                          
the electronic devices[’] own will and responsibility.”). 
 221. This touches on debates around transhumanism. Cf. JOS DE MUL, 
TRANSHUMANISM: THE CONVERGENCE OF EVOLUTION, HUMANISM, AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2002), available at http://www.filosofie-in-
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